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On October 2, 2000, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in literally
hundreds of cases that accumulated over the preceding summer.' Among
those passing quietly into the night was a petition from the Second Circuit in
SmithKline Beecham v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,2 where Chief Judge Winter
held that copyright liability did not attach to a generic drug seller's use of a
pioneer drug seller's copyrighted label.' The law clerk writing the certiorari
pool memorandum likely discarded SmithKline as a fact-bound case, in an
obscure area of copyright law in which there was no circuit split, authored
by a highly respected circuit judge. Thus the Court never saw SmithKline
for what it was: the latest monument to a judicially-led curtailing of
intellectual property rights. Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in
Florida Prepaid,4 the protection of intellectual property ("IP") has become
all the more precarious - particularly where there is a government entity
involved. Judicial hostility toward intellectual property rights is nothing
new;' however, this latest wave comes after decades of legislative action to
shore up protection of IP,6 and at a time when such property rights are
becoming increasingly central to innovation and the economy.7 What is
1. See Supreme Court Order List (Oct. 2, 2000), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/
7/257/2422/14mar20010800/www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/100200.pdf.
2. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
3. Id. at 29.
4. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
5. At one point, the "anti-patent" fervor of the Supreme Court prompted Justice Jackson, in a
dissenting opinion, to remark that "the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been
able to get its hands on." Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). The story is also told that in pre-Supreme Court confirmation discussions with Senators,
then-Judge Thurgood Marshall was asked about his views on patents. He reportedly responded, "I
haven't given patents much thought, Senator, because I'm from the Second Circuit and as you know
we don't uphold patents in the Second Circuit." Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The Creation of
the Federal Circuit, in DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 29-30 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (April 2,
1982) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1295) (creating the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j), 35 U.S.C. § 271(e))
("Hatch-Waxman" Act); Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No.
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (Oct. 28, 1992) (codified in part at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a)).
7. See, e.g., Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of
University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 461-66 (1997) (relying
on empirical data to show that patent law reforms and other changes in federal law have fueled the
rise of biotechnology and biopharmaceutical industries); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989)
(noting that the "biotechnology revolution has accelerated the commercial development of basic
research"); Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalist and the Decision to Go Public, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 293,
294 (1994); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175
(1986) (finding that pharmaceutical firms' managers believed that sixty percent of all new products
during 1981-82 would not have been developed without patent protection).
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noteworthy about this newfound judicial skepticism toward claims of
intellectual property protection is its direction in support of government
actors at both the federal and state level. Although the Federal Circuit has
adopted a pro-IP stance, resulting in more favorable rulings for patent
owners, and greater damage awards as between private actors,8 recent
decisions from the Supreme Court and other circuits show these courts all
too willing to sweep entire questions of infringement aside when there is a
federal or state agency interest at stake.
This Article addresses this new curtailment of intellectual property
rights in the name of government interests that has emerged at the turn of the
millennium. Part I examines the SmithKline decision and the role Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") policy played in shaping the outcome.
Looking past the specifics of SmithKline, Part II takes a broader view at the
interaction between IP rights and the administrative state. In particular, I
focus on a small sampling of the ways in which the FDA and other federal
agencies encumber or intrude upon, for better or for worse, one's intellectual
property. Part III offers a perspective on SmithKline as just the latest star in
a constellation of recent decisions subjugating IP rights to federal and state
government interests. Having diagnosed the current state of affairs, I then
examine a potential remedy. Part IV considers a constitutional "takings"
theory of infringement as a means of overcoming some of the recent
judicially-created obstacles to protecting intellectual property from
government use or interference. Thus, Part IV addresses one of the
unanswered questions from Florida Prepaid: what currency does the Just
Compensation Clause provide in questions of infringement?
I. IT'S ONLY A LABEL: NEW LIMITS TO COPYRIGHT AFTER SMITHKLINE
Commercial labeling is the product of creative work in which the
designer has a substantial investment and is generally copyrightable.9 In the
context of food, drugs and medical devices, such labeling is the subject of
extensive regulation by the FDA.'" FDA oversight is so rigorous that
8. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What
is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 8-9 (Working Paper No.
6204) (1997) (noting that in the eight years following the Federal Circuit's creation, it had affirmed
ninety percent of district court decisions holding patents to be valid and infringed, while reversing
twenty-eight percent of decisions of invalidity or non-infringement). Similarly, as between private
parties, the Supreme Court has upheld broad intellectual property rights. See, e.g., J.E.M. AG
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Inern., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593 (2000) (affirming the Federal Circuit's
broad reading of the utility patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101).
9. See I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[G], at 2-134 ("It is clear that [17 U.S.C.
§] 102(a)(5) includes prints and labels used for articles of merchandise under the general protection
accorded to pictorial, graphic and sculptural works." (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1478, at 54 (1976));
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29 n.5 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
10. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 343 (2000) (food), 352 (2000) (drugs and medical devices); see also
21 U.S.C. § 362 (2000) (cosmetics).
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Congress enacted a regime in 1984 to expedite the FDA's approval of
"generic" versions of pharmaceuticals." In order to qualify for expedited
review, the generic drug must contain, among other things, "information to
show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling
approved for the listed [pioneer] drug... .,2 This raises the question
whether the generic drug manufacturer, who must use "the same labeling" as
the pioneer drug, can be liable for copyright infringement if the pioneer has
a copyright on his label. Recently in SmithKline Beecham v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals,'3 the Second Circuit answered with an unequivocal "no."'4
In this Part, I consider whether the Second Circuit's decision was
unnecessarily overbroad as a matter of law. SmithKline's copyright could
have been afforded some protection while still effectuating the goals of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Further, the court could have exercised its equitable
powers in a manner that would have protected both the interests of the
copyright holder and the generic drug manufacturer. Instead, the SmithKline
court simply swept away IP protection in deference to the FDA's
administrative regime.
A. Prelude to SmithKline
SmithKline is the manufacturer of "Nicorette" nicotine chewing gum, an
over-the-counter ("OTC") product designed to "help smokers overcome the
cigarette habit."'5 Originally a prescription-only product, the FDA approved
OTC sale of Nicorette on February 9, 1996.6 To obtain approval for OTC
sale of Nicorette, SmithKline submitted to the FDA various versions of a
"user's guide and audiotape" that would accompany the product.'7
11. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. § 3550), 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)) ("Hatch-
Waxman" Act). Generic drugs are identical to pioneer drugs that have previously obtained FDA
approval and can be marketed once the pioneer drug's patent and 21 U.S.C. § 355 exclusivity
periods expire.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2000) (emphasis added).
13. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (2000) requires applications for approval of a drug to include
"specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug." The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act defines "label" and "labeling" for these purposes as "a display of written, printed or
graphic mater upon the immediate container of any article" or "accompanying such article." 21
U.S.C. § 321(k), (m) (2000). The FDA has interpreted this provision to include "[b]rochures,
booklets,... sound recordings .... and similar pieces of printed, audio, or visual matter descriptive
of a drug .. " 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2001).
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Approximately "[seventy] changes" were made at the FDA's request.'8 "The
guide features graphics and drawings and the Tape features music and actors
engaging in dialogue."' 9 They were the product of "several years and more
than one million dollars" spent by SmithKline "developing a creative Guide
and Tape -that are an important part of the Nicorette product and an
important component of the brand image that SmithKline has sought to
create."2 Thus, after the FDA approved Nicorette and its accompanying
labeling, SmithKline registered a federal copyright on the guide and
audiotape script. Subsequently, the words and music on the tape were also
registered.2
In 1999, after the expiration of SmithKline's exclusivity period for
Nicorette, Watson Pharmaceuticals received FDA approval to market a
generic version of nicotine gum over-the-counter." During Watson's
approval process, the FDA originally rejected the "proposed text for an
audio tape [because it was] substantially different from the text of the
SmithKline Tape."23 The FDA instructed Watson as follows: "The text for
your proposed audio is not the same as that for the reference listed drug,
Nicorette.... Please revise your tape text to be in accord with that of
Nicorette."24 In response, Watson used a "verbatim" copy of SmithKline's
guide and tape to accompany its generic nicotine gum, and approval was
granted.25
Before Watson could begin selling its product, SmithKline sued Watson,
alleging willful copyright infringement of its guide and tape, and sought a
preliminary injunction." In determining whether to grant the preliminary
injunction, the district court, per Judge Chin, relied on a letter it received
from the FDA, in which the agency sought to "provide some context and
clarify its position." 7  The FDA explained that it had initially advised
Watson that "the generic version of Nicorette had to have the same
labeling," but that later communications "clarified that position to address
the concern that the Nicorette labeling might be subject to copyright
protection."28 The FDA position was that "generic sponsors [of] smoking
cessation aids, have discretion to design their own audio support
18. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 23.
19. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
20. Id. at 471.
21. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 23.
22. Id.
23. SmithKline, 63 F. Supp. at 469.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 472.
26. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 23-
24 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
27. SmithKline, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
28. Id.
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materials." 9 The FDA claimed it "does not approve the specific words or
approach taken" in "behavior support materials," but rather that "it is the
general concept of providing quitters with a variety of useful support
materials that the [FDA] has required. 3° The FDA also indicated it "had
explained to Watson in a telephone conversation that 'the "same labeling"
requirement did not require that the generic's behavioral support materials
be identical to the innovator's materials."'" Relying on the FDA's
representations, Judge Chin rejected "Watson's claim that it was forced by
the FDA to copy the text of the SmithKline Guide and Tape verbatim" as a
"gross exaggeration."3 He concluded that "[t]here are many different ways
that a manufacturer can express the ideas used in SmithKline's Guide and
Tape, and Watson certainly could have proposed some different
language ... to avoid problems of copyright infringement."" Examining the
balance of harms, the district court granted SmithKline's motion for a
preliminary injunction.
Subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary injunction, Watson
revised its instructional materials to address the copyright concerns and
submitted them to the FDA for its approval.3" The FDA rejected the new
guide, but advised Watson that it would approve a revised version of the
allegedly infringing user's guide.36 Watson was provided with a marked-up
copy of its allegedly infringing guide, in which the FDA indicated only a
few bracketed words could be replaced. 7 The FDA thus determined that
Watson "had to copy verbatim substantially all of the text used in the
SmithKline Guide" and in the tape.38 In response to a request from Judge
Chin to "revisit" its decision, the FDA "decline[d] to change its approach to
Watson's labeling."" It refused to "take copyright consideration into
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 472.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 473.
35. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214,
1999 WL 1243894, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999).
36. See id.
37. Id. at *3-4. For example, on the first page, the introductory words "SO YOU DECIDED TO
QUIT! Congratulations!" could be replaced, as well as "Wallet Card" in the context of indicating
where toll free numbers were printed in the user's guide, but nothing else. Id. If we are to take the
FDA seriously, presumably it would have refused to approve changing "Your decision to stop
smoking is an important one," id. at *3, to "Your decision to stop smoking is important."
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id.
account ... ."" Thus, given the FDA's position, "it appear[ed to the district
court] that Watson [could not] market its product without using instructional
materials that are indeed identical in substantial respects to SmithKline's
copyrighted materials.
4
Facing this conundrum, Judge Chin chastised the FDA for refusing
"now to take into account copyright considerations, when it has previously
suggested that it ought to," for flip-flopping in its position on Watson's
guide and tape, and for refusing "to acknowledge that the materials in this
case are not just 'labeling,' but rather... instructional materials that do
involve a certain amount of creativity. 42
[The FDA] refuses to permit Watson to express such basic concepts
as "don't be discouraged," "quitting isn't easy," "it takes time," and
"the important thing is to try again until you succeed" in different
words, when these same ideas could be expressed in a manner that
would protect the public health without violating SmithKline's
copyrights. It surely has a duty to address the apparent conflict
between the Copyright Act and the FFDCA [Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act].43
Despite this frustration, and mindful of the fact that the FDA was not a
party to the action," the district court concluded that it would be unjust "to
continue to enjoin Watson... ."" Although he dissolved the injunction,
Judge Chin also noted that SmithKline might still seek a "remedy [of]
damages, in the nature of implied license fees, even though that remedy may
not be an adequate one.
'
"
46
B. The SmithKline Decision
The Second Circuit accepted an interlocutory appeal of the decision to
dissolve the preliminary injunction, and with one important caveat, it
affirmed. Writing for the panel, Chief Judge Winter held that "recognition
of SmithKline's claim here would severely undermine the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments" and therefore directed "dismissal of SmithKline's complaint
for failure to state a claim.
47
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *6 n.3.
45. Id. at *6.
46. Id. at *7.
47. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
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The court of appeals accepted that "SmithKline has demonstrated the
existence of substantial issues under the copyright laws" and that "[a]bsent
more, the propriety of a preliminary injunction would seem clear."" It also
rejected theories of non-infringement as a "fair use" or "implied license."49
However, the court concluded that the "Hatch-Waxman Amendments...
not only permit but require producers of generic drugs to use the same
labeling as was approved for, and is used in, the sale of the pioneer drug,
even if that label has been copyrighted.""0  Acknowledging that the
"Copyright Act seems to prohibit such copying," the court found "a conflict
between two statutes."" Chief Judge Winter concluded that "[i]f copyright
law were to prevail, producers of generic drugs will always be delayed in -
and quite often prohibited from - marketing the generic product, results at
great odds with the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments."52  In
contrast, there would be "[n]o such severe undermining of the purpose of the
copyright laws" as "Itihe creation of the "labels to be approved by the FDA,
such as the user's guide and audio tape, is ancillary to the FDA's
administrative process." 3 In Chief Judge Winter's view, SmithKline simply
did not need the protection of the copyright laws to have the incentive to
create the guide and tapes. 4 Thus, the Second Circuit held that in enacting
the Hatch-Waxman Amendment, Congress had trumped, or unknowingly
amended, the copyright laws with respect to labels in the generic drug
context." Although the court limited its holding strictly to labels of "generic
drug manufacturers who are required by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to
copy labeling," its interpretation required the altogether dismissal of
SmithKline' s complaint. 6
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 27.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 29; cf. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Posner, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The balance tips against protection when the invention is
the sort that was likely to be made, and as soon, even if no one could have patented it.").
55. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21,
29 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000). Following the Supreme Court's lead in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000), the court noted that "both time of
enactment and specificity favor our interpretation," as the Hatch-Waxman Act post-dated the
Copyright Act of 1976, and "the Copyright Act's broad generality contrasts with the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments' specific generic drug approval scheme." SmithKline, 211 F.3d. at 28 n.3.
56. Id. at 29.
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C. Hard Cases Make Bad Law
SmithKline presents a difficult conflict between two statutory regimes
arguably at odds with each other. One, the copyright laws, are aimed at
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."" The other,
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, were intended to provide greater, and
therefore cheaper, generic drug availability through expedited FDA
approval: a goal effectuated by allowing generics to piggy-back on the work
of pioneers. Copyright laws attack the free-rider problem; Hatch-Waxman
arguably exacerbates it, though for laudable ends. But are these two regimes
as necessarily in conflict as this dichotomy makes them out to be?
Obviously, the court of appeals thought so. Perhaps Chief Judge Winter's
clean resolution - that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments trumped the
copyright laws, thereby eliminating SmithKline's claim of infringement -
was too easy. It was not only overbroad, but in the long-run actually fails to
effectuate the purpose of either statutory regime, purposes which are not in
as sharp a conflict as the court would have us believe. At the root of the
matter, however, was the court's willingness to allow effective appropriation
of SmithKline's copyright, not by Watson Pharmaceuticals, but by the FDA.
1. Overbreadth as a Matter of Law
The Second Circuit found a direct conflict between the copyright laws
and the Hatch-Waxman Act based on its interpretation of "same" in section
355(j).5 1 While conceding that "'same' may mean something less than
'identical,"' the court concluded that "a legislative drafter would believe that
a sameness requirement would lead to creation of works that would easily
fall within the copyright law's infringement test of 'substantial similarity."'' 9
Of course, Congress had not foreseen the conflict posited by Chief Judge
Winter,' and, if it had, it is doubtful that a legislator would have considered
the intricacies of Second Circuit law. This "substantial similarity" test is a
product of the Second Circuit, and in most cases is satisfied by an "'ordinary
observer test' which queries whether an average lay observer would
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work."6 It is a test well-suited to determining infringement of
patterns and designs, but in the setting of regulated labels, it proves too
much.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
58. 21 U.SC. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2000). See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 26-27.
59. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 27.
60. See id. at 29.
61. Hamil Am., Inc., v. GFI, Inc., 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The origins of the "substantial similarity" test can be found in Bevan v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. ,62 where plaintiffs alleged that CBS had
infringed their copyrighted play "Stalag 17" with the TV show "Hogan's
Heroes."63 The district court overturned a jury verdict on statutory copyright
claims for the plaintiff because "[s]ubstantial similarity ... is to be judged
by comparison not of general ideas but of that which constitutes the author's
'expression."" Indeed, "Copyright is not infringed by an expression of the
idea which is substantially similar where such similarity is necessary
because the ideas or system being described is the same."'6 The cases where
the "substantial similarity" test has found the most currency, are
unsurprisingly not those involving writings,6 but rather those involving
patterns and fabric designs, such as Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer
California67 and Hamil America, Inc. v. GFI, Inc.," the latter being the case
Chief Judge Winter cited. This is for the simple reason that ideas are not
copyrightable, but specific collections of words or patterns are. Thus, Judge
Tyler, who first articulated the "substantial similarity" test as such
"doubt[ed] the validity and efficacy of the 'audience' or 'lay observer' rubric
[of the substantially similar] test, except perhaps in comparatively simple
fields such as fabrics or clothing designs. In the areas of... written works,
this 'test' has the weakness of avoiding the serious analysis virtually
required ...."69
Virtually every food or drug label, regardless of whether it is required to
be the "same" by the Hatch-Waxman Act, would fail the "substantial
similarity" test under Chief Judge Winter's approach. Certainly, "familiar
objects" enjoy only a narrow copyright." This does not mean they enjoy no
copyright, only that the bar for finding infringement is high. So one would
expect it to be with FDA regulated labels - after all, they must all conform
to certain FDA requirements, which alone would make them "substantially
similar." However, requiring the label of identical drugs to contain the
62. 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
63. See id. at 602.
64. id. at 605.
65. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d. Cir. 1986) ("The copyright
protection granted to appellant's book extends only to its particular expression of ideas, not to the
ideas themselves, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), a distinction easier to state than to apply."). The court noted
that "[iun assessing claims of substantial similarity, courts therefore must decide 'whether the
similarities shared by the works are something more than mere generalized idea or themes[.].' Id. at
48-49 (quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 198 1)).
67. 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving fabric design pattern).
68. 193 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1999) (involving floral design used on fabric).
69. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 604 n.3 (emphasis added).
70. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
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"same" ideas is not tantamount to requiring that they be identical. The
Hatch-Waxman Act requires the latter, not the former. Indeed, leaving the
world of Second Circuit case law, we discover that other courts recognize
that some copyright infringement requires "verbatim or near-verbatim
copying."7' Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Alberto-Culver, per then-Judge
Stevens, resolved a conflict involving labels on female deodorants by
holding that the general descriptive claims of a product were not
copyrightable. 2 The court rejected arguments that the defendant infringed in
making substantially similar claims." Courts interpreting Alberto-Culver
have taken it to mean that if "fact-based works are involved, 'substantial
similarity' generally exists only where there has been a verbatim or near-
verbatim copying."74 Thus where the alleged infringer "expresses many of
the same ideas ... but it alters the precise language[,] in doing so [it] avoids
infringement." As one court noted:
Perhaps the same result might not have followed comparably
modest changes to the text of a play or other work of fiction. But
where as here an author's options are limited by the need to present
the same facts and to describe identical processes, all that can
reasonably be expected is that he or she avoid the parroting or near-
parroting of the earlier language. [The defendant] did that, and
copyright law requires nothing more.75
Thus, the test for infringing a label required by the Hatch-Waxman Act,
as with all labels, could be that of identicality.7 As "same" may be
interpreted as something less than "identical," copyright holders such as
SmithKline, who put tremendous time and resources into developing
creative supplementary materials, would be protected against direct verbatim
copying.
2. Between a Rock and a Hard Place or Aligning Purposes?
The response to the argument advocating findings of infringement
where the materials are identical is that it would be contrary to the purposes
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hatch-Waxman was intended to expedite
approval of generic drugs with the end goal being to provide the American
71. Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. I11. 1995).
72. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.).
73. Id.
74. Sassafras, 889 F. Supp. at 347.
75. Id.
76. The Second Circuit dismissed this argument in a footnote, deferring to the FDA's
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act as requiring the "manufacturers of generic drugs to copy
the labeling of pioneers drugs 'near-verbatim."' SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 27 n.2. The reasonableness
of this deference will be explored in Part I.C.4, infra.
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consumer with a greater variety of pharmaceuticals at a lower cost.
Requiring a generic drug company to develop its own labeling for approval
slows the process, and thus, the "same," even perhaps "identical" labeling is
required. Therefore, the copyright of the label must give way to the
generic's use. This is all efficient, because "the profit sought by the creator
of the pioneer drug label flows primarily from the administrative approval of
the drug and the patent and exclusivity periods," thus, it is "simply not
conceivable that ... pioneer drug producers will so fear the copying of
labels by future generic drug producers that some ... will lack the incentive
to create labeling needed for FDA approval."77
Chief Judge Winter's reasoning recognizes that copyright law "treads a
difficult and often tenuous line" between promoting and restricting
expression and innovation. 8 As Lord Mansfield put it:
We must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one that men of ability, who have employed their
time for the service of the community may not be deprived of their
just merits and reward for their ingenuity and labor; the other that
the world may not be deprived of improvements nor the progress of
the arts be retarded. 9
However, the end goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act - more, cheaper drugs
- is no different from the end goal of intellectual property law. That is,
granting a limited monopoly creates the incentive to innovate and develop,
and thus over the long-run provides society with greater goods to choose
among.
Therefore, rather than reading the copyright laws as effectively repealed
by the Hatch-Waxman Act in this case, the court of appeals should have
found a way to satisfy both (i.e., by applying the verbatim standard). This is
particularly true given that the Supreme Court counsels against reading even
minor repeals by implication.8' Where such an interpretation is required, the
77. Id. at 29.
78. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 604.
79. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (1785), quoted in Bevan, 329 F. Supp. At 605.
80. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[T]he ultimate aim
is, by this incentive to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the [copyright] clause ... is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare....").
81. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (noting that courts must read two federal
statutes "to give effect to each if [it] can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.");
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985)
(examining the Court's decision in Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1964) and discussing the maxim
court is to "narrow[] only to the extent necessary to effectuate [the
conflicting] policy."82 True, Chief Judge Winter's opinion limits the effect
of the Hatch-Waxman Act to a generic's labels, rather than broader
advertising."3 Even so, he reached further than was necessary to resolve the
case. By concluding that Hatch-Waxman allows identical copying, generics
are now free to lift every word, every graphic, and even the very music used
by the pioneer in its tapes. Changes that the district court found to be
important in dissolving the injunction would no longer be necessary.'
Under the Second Circuit's rule, generics are free to copy with impunity.
The court exacerbates the "free rider" problem that copyright laws were
intended to address.
Over the long-run, we cannot even take solace in the notion that society
is at least benefiting from the more rapidly available, less expensive drugs.
Pioneer drug manufacturers will still seek to recover the costs of research,
development, and approval - including the labeling costs - but they will
now have to recover them over a shorter time frame. Thus, as a simple
matter of economics, where labeling costs are high, the cost of the pioneer
drug will rise.85 As a monopolist, the rational pioneer will price its drug
disfavoring repeals by implication).
82. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 292.
83. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
We emphasize that we do not read the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to repeal other rights
under the Copyright Act of copyright owners in SmithKline's circumstances. Even
though such an owner cannot enforce its copyright against generic drug manufacturers
who are required by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to copy labeling and who do no
more than that, it still retains a copyright, if otherwise valid, in the label and might well
pursue copyright claims against potential infringers in other circumstances, e.g., use of
the copyrighted material in non-labeling advertisements.
Id. at 29.
84. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ.
9214, 1999 WL 1243894, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999). Judge Chin noted,
[T]he revised materials are now significantly more different from SmithKline's materials.
For example, the user guide features a new layout and graphics and is designed as a
package insert rather than as a booklet. Watson represents that the music and actors on
the audio taper are different, and the transcript of the audio tape shows that the
instructions are presented in a different format and factual setting.
Id.
85. It should be frankly acknowledged that in most cases the labeling costs are practically
insignificant to the costs of research and development. It is the rare case, such as SmithKline, where
a manufacturer will have spent in excess of "one million dollars" developing labeling such as the
"Guide and Tape, in a process spanning several years." SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,
L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Additionally,
[T]he profit sought by the creator of the pioneer drug labels flows primarily form the
administrative approval of the drug and the patent and exclusivity periods free from
competition that follow .... It is simply not conceivable that, if we reject SmithKline's
claim, pioneer drug products will so fear the copying of labels by future generic drug
products that some pioneer products--or even one of them-will lack the incentive to
create labeling needed for FDA approval.
SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 29. Of course, it is only the rare case that should be of concern to us, for
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where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.86 As it is no longer able to
spread the costs of label development over the life of the drug, but instead
must recoup those costs during the exclusivity period (as the free-riding
competitor will not have those development costs), the pioneer must raise
the price of the pioneer drug. Thus, in most cases, marginal cost will equal
marginal revenue at a higher price and lower quantity of production. 7 The
result is detrimental to the consumer for the life of the pioneer's monopoly.
This negative outcome does not end once the generics enter the market. The
generic manufacturers are not philanthropists, but rather profit maximizers.
To the extent that they are able to capitalize on monopoly profits, they will.
There are not an infinite number of generic drug manufacturers, and thus we
will expect to see oligopolistic behavior.8" While generics will be able to
undercut the pioneers, and must do so in order to gain original market share,
eventually prices will stabilize - and if they are starting at a higher price,
they will likely stop at a higher price. The pioneer will not be able to cut
prices as aggressively as it now has proportionately higher average costs
than the generic, in the amount of the cost of developing the label.
Once the generics enter the market, pioneers will now face competition
from their own work in label development, where generics free ride on the
years and millions of dollars spent developing creative labeling.89 As the
district court originally noted, the guide and tape "are an important part of
the Nicorette product and an important component of the brand image that
SmithKline has sought to create. The introduction into the market of
virtually identical user guides and instructional tapes is likely to confuse
consumers and threaten consumer goodwill."'  The net result is a
disincentive for pioneer drug manufacturers to invest anything more than the
bare minimum FDA requires in their labeling. This effect is acutely felt in
the OTC market where it is brand name and brand image that the pioneer
must rely on to distinguish it from the generic version. Thus, while it is
undoubtedly true that the SmithKline decision will not create a "lack [of]
only then is a copyright of the labeling likely to be in dispute.
86. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, ET AL, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST ch. 4
(2d ed. 1995).
87. See id. at 77.
88. See PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 252-263 (5th ed. 1997). This
behavior, of course, depends on the number of generic drug manufacturers of a particular drug. The
larger the number, the less likely we would expect to see oligopolistic behavior. See id.
89. SmithKline provided affidavits in which the company claimed that it "spent more than one
million dollars developing the Guide and Tape," SmithKline, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 469, and that it "spent
in excess of $200 million in bringing Nicorette to market and developing a brand image." Id. at 472.
90. Id. at 471.
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incentive to create labeling needed for FDA approval,"9' it will reduce the
incentive to make labeling an integral part of marketing and investment.
Brand image will be divorced from anything a competitor may copy at will,
and the research and study that went into designing layouts, formats,
settings, and music will but cut to a minimum. The net effect is a less
effective product for the end user, because the interests of the pioneer
manufacturer in developing effective marketing materials and the FDA in
approving effective products are no longer congruent.
3. An Equitable Way Out?
The SmithKline decision creates an all or nothing situation: either it is
copyright infringement and therefore the Hatch-Waxman regime is stillborn;
or the Hatch-Waxman Act preempts the copyright statute and the plaintiff
has no claim. Yet our choices need not be so stark. At the district court,
Judge Chin recognized that there was potentially a third way out, though
procedurally it was not the proper time for him to explore it. He noted that
even if SmithKline were correct in its "interpretation as to the interplay
between the Copyright Act and the [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act],
a court of equity is not likely to find that the public should be deprived of the
alternative of a generic version of Nicorette," and therefore no injunctive
relief would be granted.92 However, he noted that SmithKline might still
have a damages remedy "in the nature of implied license fees."" Thus, prior
to the Second Circuit's eviscerating SmithKline's cause of action, a court
exercising its equitable powers could have awarded a reasonable royalty to
SmithKline for the use of its copyright.
The awarding of a reasonable royalty or licensing fee for infringement
of intellectual property is hardly a novel concept. 4 Such a remedy is
91. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 872 (2000).
92. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214,
1999 WL 1243894, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999).
93. Id.
94. For example, as will be discussed in Part II, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) requires the disclosure of registration data submitted by the pioneer
manufacturer and allows subsequent use by "me too" manufacturers. 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(l)(D)
(2000). Such "me too" registrants may be required to compensate the pioneer for the use of the data.
See 40 C.F.R. pt. 152 E (2000). Taking the licensing concept to the extreme, some scholars
advocate completely replacing our current intellectual property rights regime with a "reward system"
in which the state offers "rewards to creators of information" and such information is then "made
available to all who want it" for a fee. STEVEN SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW ch. 12, at 12-18 (2000) (unpublished manuscript). Professor Shavell argues that like the
property rights system "the reward system encourages production of information because the creator
of information obtains a benefit from so doing. But unlike the property rights system, the reward
system results in optimal dissemination of information because the information is in the public
domain; anyone can use it." Id.
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explicitly recognized in the patent and copyright laws.95 In patent law, such
a "reasonable royalty" is assessed by considering the "royalties received by
the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to
prove an established royalty,"96 as well as a "hypothetical negotiation"
between a willing licensor and a willing licensee.97 Although the Seventh
Circuit has endorsed the "hypothetical negotiation" approach in copyright
infringement,98 the Second Circuit has rejected it.99 Thus, we see a hesitance
by the Second Circuit to engage in such judicial discretion that was echoed
by Chief Judge Winter in SmithKline. He rejected "fair use" and "implied
license" theories in part because "[i]f either were to prevail, some new law,
essentially judge-made, would have to be fashioned."'" Instead, he found
more compelling "straightforward ground that the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments... require producers of generic drugs to use the same
labeling," thus trumping the copyright laws.' This ruling did preclude the
need for the court to exercise its equitable powers and fashion a remedy or
"some new law"; however it can hardly be said that it was an act of judicial
minimalism. This is particularly ironic given the pervasiveness of the use of
the "reasonable royalty" alternative in the copyright context.
Although the Copyright Act only specifies injunctive remedies,"7 actual
damages,"' profits of the infringer, °'0 or statutory damages,' 5 courts may
exercise their equitable powers and award a "reasonable royalty" while
declining to issue an injunction." Quoting Professor Nimmer's influential
treatise on copyright, the Ninth Circuit observed that "where great public
injury would be worked by an injunction, the courts might... award
damages or a continuing royalty instead of an injunction in such special
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer .. "); 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (2000)
(compulsory license for not-for-profit broadcast relays), 115 (2000) (compulsory license allowing
musicians and record companies to make and sell their own recordings of copyrighted musical works
("cover" license)), 119 (2000) (compulsory license for satellite transmission to "unserved
households").
96. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
97. Id.
98. See Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 362 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985).
99. See Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Fredonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 405 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 25.
101. Id.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
103. Id. § 504.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988).
circumstances."'' 7  Similarly, the reasonable royalty is the only relief
available in a suit for patent or copyright infringement against the United
States or contractors "acting for the Government and with the authorization
or consent of the Government.... .""' No injunctive relief may be sought." 9
The "public injury" exception endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, and the denial
of injunctive relief in suits against the United States both are founded on the
recognition that in some circumstances a greater societal good is served by
allowing infringement. Yet, in these circumstances, the property right of the
IP owner is not ignored: it is compensated with a royalty. As Judge Chin
recognized, SmithKline was ripe for similar treatment. Watson would be
able to use the "same" label as SmithKline, while SmithKline would not go
uncompensated. Thus, granting an "implied license" to Watson would have
effectuated the Hatch-Waxman Act goal of expediting FDA review and
simultaneously preserved the value of SmithKline's copyright by preventing
free-riding. Such financial compensation would at least help to bring
SmithKline's interest in developing the guide and tape back into alignment
with the FDA approval process. The short and long-term public interest is
served, and the purpose of both legislative regimes is met. Of course, such a
contorted license/royalty treatment would not be necessary but for the
FDA's refusal to consider copyright in applying the Hatch-Waxman Act to
generic drug applications.
107. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B] at 1
14-56.2 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)); Deltak, 767 F.2d at 362-64. But see BTA, 887 F.2d at
405.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (2000) ("[T]he exclusive remedy of the owner of such copyright shall be
by action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation as damages for such infringement, including the minimum statutory
damages ....").
109. Cf. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1118 n.13 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1051 (1978) ("We refer to the fact that a patentee cannot obtain an injunction against a government-
supplier or government-contractor and is confined, for his exclusive remedy, to a suit for 'reasonable
and entire compensation' (i.e., monetary compensation) against the United States under 28 U.S.C. §
1498."). The Federal Circuit recently addressed this issue in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996), judgment vacated, 520 U.S. 1183 (1997), aff'd, 140 F.3d
1470 (1998):
The government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking
of property under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power
of eminent domain and the patent holder's remedy for such use is prescribed by 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a).... Under section 1498(a), the patent owner is entitled to its
'reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture." Because recovery is
based on eminent domain, the proper measure is "what the owner has lost, not what the
taker has gained .. " Generally, the preferred manner of reasonably and entirely
compensating the patent owner is to require the government to pay a reasonable royalty
for its license as well as damages for its delay in paying the royalty.
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4. The Real Culprit: The FDA
The SmithKline decision represented judicial capitulation by the court of
appeals to the FDA at the expense of SmithKline's intellectual property
rights. However, it did not come before the district court expressed its
frustration with the FDA. Judge Chin lamented the FDA's taking "varying,
inconsistent positions on whether Watson's instructional materials must be
identical to SmithKline's materials.""' He lambasted the FDA for violating
its "duty to address the apparent conflict between the Copyright Act and the
FFDCA,'"" and noted that he was "tempted" to rule "that the FDA must take
[SmithKline's] copyrights into account.""' 2 In the end, he refrained because
of the procedural posture of the case - the FDA was not a party to the
action."' Likewise it was procedural posture that would tee up SmithKline's
claim for the Second Circuit to dismiss. SmithKline came to the court of
appeals as an interlocutory appeal of the dissolving of a preliminary
injunction. In balancing the harms and the public interest at the preliminary
injunction stage, the district court was forced to reject SmithKline's
argument that Watson assert a claim against the FDA under the
Administrative Procedure Act or some other administrative remedy, though
it noted that "[s]uch a claim might have merit, as the FDA's conduct in this
case has indeed been perplexing."'" Thus, although the district court
concluded "SmithKline has demonstrated irreparable harm and the existence
of sufficiently serious issues going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation,""' 5 it recognized "[i]n view of the FDA's position," that "no
generic version of Nicorette is likely to reach the market anytime soon,
unless SmithKline's arguments are rejected.""'
In defense of the FDA, the flip-flops, although "perplexing," are not
incomprehensible. Clearly, the FDA was working its way through new
territory at the intersection of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the copyright
laws, at the end of the process settling on a clear, easy-to-administer rule
requiring use of nearly identical language in the generic's label. Such a rule
would certainly expedite review of labels in conformance with the objectives
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Yet, surely Judge Chin was correct when he
said, "it is difficult to understand how the FDA can simply ignore the
110. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214,
1999 WL 1243894, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999).
Ill. /d. at "6.
112. Id. at *6 n.3.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *5.
116. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
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public's interest in the protection of copyrights, and I would think that it is
within the FDA's mandate to address the interplay between the Copyright
Act and the FFDCA.""' It is not enough for the FDA to simply hide behind
some notion of the public interest without taking into account all aspects
thereof.' 8 Thus, we must consider why the FDA insisted on interpreting the
Hatch-Waxman Act as it did, and whether such an interpretation would have
survived a direct, rather than collateral challenge.
A generic drug manufacturer wishing to produce a pioneer's drug must
submit an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") to the FDA."9
Among other things the ANDA must include "information to show that the
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
proposed for the new drug have been previously approved for a [pioneer]
drug""'2 as well as "information to show that the labeling proposed for the
new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [pioneer] drug."'2'
However, the FDA may not require the ANDA applicant to include
"information in addition to that [statutorily] required."' 2  If the generic
applicant meets the ANDA requirements in section 355, then the FDA is
required to approve the application,'23 and is expected to do so within one
hundred eighty days.'24 Thus, the FDA has a short period of time to
determine whether "information submitted in the application is insufficient
to show that the labeling proposed for the drug is the same as the labeling
approved for the [pioneer] drug,' 25 which it must do while determining that
the active ingredients,' 26 route of administration and dosage,'27  andbioequivalence,' 21 are the same. Obviously, it is in the FDA's interest to
simplify the review, and requiring identical labels does just that. Examining
different individual labels on a case-by-case basis, without a bright-line test
for "sameness" is costly. '29 The verbatim approach has the benefit of being
117. ld.at"6 n.3.
118. Indeed this very issue was litigated in the context of "public health" and the use of
cost/benefit analysis by the Environmental Protection Agency. See Brief for Cross-Petitioners, Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Browner, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) (No. 99-1426), available at 2000 WL
1014021. Cross-Petitioners argued that cost/benefit analysis is inherent in the very concept of
"public health," and thus it is erroneous for EPA to refuse to consider anything outside of health
effects in promulgating rules under the Clean Air Act. See id. However, in the context of the
statutory language of the Clean Air Act in dispute, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
119. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000).
120. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
121. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
122. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
123. See id. § 3550)(3).
124. See id. § 355(j)(4)(A).
125. Id. § 355(j)(3)(G).
126. See id. § 355(j)(3)(C).
127. See id. § 355(j)(3)(D).
128. See id. § 355(j)(3)(F).
129. Cf. PETER BARTON HuTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW 1045 (2d ed. 1991).
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even-handed and actually simplifies the process for the ANDA applicant - it
just may come at the expense of the pioneer's copyright. 3 If the FDA took a
less restrictive stance where a copyright existed, it potentially opened the
door to challenges from generics seeking changes to labels even in the
absence of a copyright issue.
The FDA's desire for simplification is surely reasonable, but that does
not mean that its interpretation of "same" in the labeling context is. In fact,
FDA's original position recognized the "concern that [such] labeling might
be subject to copyright protection,""' thus advising that "the 'same labeling'
requirement did not require that the generic's behavioral support materials
be identical to the innovator's materials."'32  Why then the change in
position?
The FDA claimed that it would not take copyright considerations into
account because it "ha[d] never been directed by Congress to consider
potential copyright rights in approving generic drug labeling.' 3 However,
that is akin to it saying it simply did not want to consider copyrights.
Perhaps the FDA was emboldened to take this aggressive position because it
essentially had a free pass in the SmithKline case. As it was not a party to
the case, there was little chance of FDA being bound by an unfavorable
court decision. Further, as it was not a direct review of the FDA's policy,
the agency was not required to give a rationale - it just had to act. FDA
reasonably gambled that Watson would not resort to a direct challenge,
hoping instead to have its policy de facto approved by a district court
strapped with limited options. Given the procedural posture - a preliminary
injunction - FDA was likely to get its way (as in fact it did). What FDA
likely did not anticipate was the added bonus of the Second Circuit's
("[L]itigation on a case-by-case basis [] is an inadequate method of regulation. It fails to inform the
regulated industry of its obligations, it involves ... delay, and the end results are often uncertain.
Worst of all, it inevitably results in invidious selective enforcement .. ") [hereinafter HuTr &
MERRILL]. See also Weinberger v. Bentex Pharms., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973) (recognizing that "a
case by case approach is inherently unfair").
130. As the Second Circuit noted, "the administrative process of approving a new label would...
drain the resources of the FDA and generic producer," particularly if "labels that were 'substantially
similar' to copyrighted labels on pioneer drugs had to be avoided .. " SmithKline Beecham
Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 872 (2000).
131. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
467, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
132. Id. (quoting FDA letter to the district court).
133. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214
1999 WL 1243894, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999) (quoting FDA letter to the district court).
interpretation of Hatch-Waxman as trumping the copyright laws. Chief
Judge Winter's opinion is as much or more than the FDA could have hoped
for had its interpretation been reviewed under Chevron'.. analysis.
Suppose the FDA's interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act had been
directly challenged - how would the FDA have fared? Such a challenge
would have been reviewed under Chevron's two-step analysis. Step one
asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."'" The second step, if "Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue," is to determine "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute," i.e., is
the agency interpretation reasonable?'36 The Second Circuit's decision in
SmithKline does not predispose an answer to these questions. Such a direct
challenge to agency interpretation would not have been made under the
duress imposed by the FDA in SmithKline, where if the copyright laws were
not put aside, the generic drug could not be marketed. As FDA would be a
party, it would be required to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with
the reviewing court's judgment. If the deck had not been stacked, who is to
say that the Second Circuit might not have been predisposed differently?'"
But more importantly, the reviewing court applying Chevron, (unlike the
SmithKline opinion, which turns on de novo interpretation of the Hatch-
Waxman Act by the court of appeals), would have to squarely consider (1)
did Congress address this precise issue?, and (2) is the FDA interpretation
reasonable?
Obviously, Congress did not consider the meaning of "same...
labeling" against the backdrop of the copyright laws.'36 The SmithKline
opinion concedes that Congress had not "foreseen the statutory conflict
exposed by the present action.""' Thus, the question remaining under
Chevron step two is whether the FDA's interpretation is a "permissible" or
"reasonable" one. As one influential commentator has noted:
134. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S..837, 843-44 (1984). Where the intent of Congress
is not clear, courts uphold the FDA's "permissible" and "reasonable" interpretation of the statute.
See, e.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (relying on Chevron in deferring to
FDA's interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act).
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
136. Id. at 843.
137. At the district court level, Judge Chin's opinion clearly suggested that he would have favored
an interpretation that at least accounted for the copyright laws. See SmithKline, 1999 WL 1243894,
at *6.
138. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
139. Id. at 29.
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[T]he fact that Congress simply has not considered or spoken on a
particular issue certainly is no bar to the Food and Drug
Administration exerting initiative and leadership in the public
interest. [T]he Food and Drug Administration is obligated to
develop whatever innovative and creative regulatory programs are
reasonable and are most appropriate to achieve the fundamental
objectives laid down by Congress.4 °
Thus, while we must consider whether FDA's interpretation reasonably
effectuates the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, it seems, as Judge Chin
suggested, that we must temper this with FDA's obligation to effectuate the
copyright laws in the "public interest" as well.' In other words, the proper
inquiry is not a reasonable interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the
abstract, but in light of the Copyright Act.
Originally, FDA thought that "the same.., labeling requirement" was
not particularly rigorous with aids and supplementary material as the agency
claimed it "does not approve the specific words or approach taken. Rather,
it is the more general concept of providing .., a variety of useful support
materials that the [FDA] has required."'42  Prior to the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman regime, the bottleneck for the approval of generic drugs was
the requirement of a full "New Drug Application" for post-1962 new drugs,
which entailed providing detailed safety and effectiveness information
(including human testing), even if it was identical to that of the pioneer
drug.'43 The data accompanying the pioneer drug "constituted confidential
commercial information that was not disclosable to the public or available
for use by another applicant . . . . "' It was these costly and laborious
investigations by the generic manufacture and the accompanying FDA
approval that the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to by-pass. ' The various
requirements for ANDAs established by the Hatch-Waxman Act, including
the "same ... labeling," are to ensure that, in short-circuiting the full new
drug approval process, public health is not compromised. Thus, it is crucial
140. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 177 (1973), reprinted in Hul17 & MERRILL, supra note 129, at 1041-
42.
141. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc. No. 99 Civ. 9214
1999 WL 1243894, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999).
142. Id. at *2.
143. See HuTTr & MERRILL, supra note 129, at 484.
144. Id.
145. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at pt. 2 (August I, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2688 ("Secretary Califano urged Congress to act for three reasons: (1) The exclusion of generics was
anti-competitive; (2) the requirements of duplicative tests on humans unnecessarily endangered
human health; and (3) the approval process diluted the resources of the FDA.").
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that the generic drug actually be the same as the previously approved
pioneer and used in the same manner. Labeling is obviously crucial to use.'4 6
Presumably, in most cases, the label could be copied directly - as most
labels, containing only a description of the product, would not even be
copyrightable.' 7 However, where there is a copyright, one would think that
the FDA would be obligated to protect the "public interest" in copyrights,
and therefore provide guidance on how to reasonably avoid infringement -
guidance like that provided to Watson before FDA changed positions to
require near verbatim copying. Such guidance certainly would not be
binding on the copyright holder, who would still be free to sue for
infringement, but it would provide the reviewing court with a reasoned
approach (something FDA failed to do in SmithKline) that accommodates
both the intellectual property ights and the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
regime.
This approach is not foreign to FDA, which would not give away
confidential safety and effectiveness data until mandated to do so by
Congress.'48 With this history of protecting private rights, it is, if anything, a
surprise that FDA would be so willing to ride roughshod over copyright
protection. Just as FDA did not give away confidential data without
congressional authorization, so too it should not have staked out a position
effectively requiring copyrighted labels be given away without direction
from Congress. Far from supporting the FDA's position, the Agency's
acknowledgment that it "ha[d] never been directed by Congress to consider
potential copyright rights in approving generic drug labeling,"'49 cuts against
an interpretation that altogether trumps copyright protection. In the Hatch-
Waxman Act, Congress developed an elaborate system that cut into some
aspects of patent protection.' 0 Had Congress intended to curb or particularly
eliminate copyright protection, it knew how to tell FDA.
In the rare case of a valid copyright, how much trouble is it for FDA to
review similar, though not identical guidance material? While any review
comes at some cost, surely the bottleneck in Watson's generic drug approval
would have been science-heavy inquiries such as confirmation of the
146. Cf. SmithKline, 1999 WL 1243894, at *6 n.2.
147. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972).
148. See Hu'r & MERRILL, supra note 129, at 484. However, once it received this mandate from
Congress, the FDA became zealous in making data available for public disclosure. See infra Part
II.C.
149. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 24
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000) (requiring generic certification that the pioneer: (I) has
no patent; (II) has an expired patent; (IIl) has a patent that will expire before the generic is approved;
or (IV) has an invalid patent or a patent that will not be infringed by the generic's use); 35 U.S.C. §
271(e) (2000) (overruling Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), by making experimental use of a patented drug for FDA approval a noninfringing act;
defining generic certification that the pioneer has an invalid patent or a patent that will not be
infringed by the generic's use as an act of patent infringement).
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bioequivalence, rather than determining if Watson had adequately
"express[ed] such basic concepts as 'don't be discouraged,' 'quitting isn't
easy,' 'it akes time,' and 'the important thing is to try again until you
succeed' in different words, when these same ideas could be expressed in a
manner that would protect the public health without violating SmithKline's
copyrights."''5' Although there may be cases where protecting public health
would require identical labeling, it is reasonable to believe in those cases the
label would not be copyrightable in the first instance.'52 In SmithKline, far
from saying the copyright was invalid, the Second Circuit went out of its
way to "emphasize" that SmithKline "still retains a copyright, if otherwise
valid, in the label and might well pursue copyright claims against potential
infringers in other circumstances .. . .""' In sum, the FDA's interpretation
of the Hatch-Waxman Act is not a reasonable one, as its own vacillation on
the matter demonstrates.
This brings us to the final point about a hypothetical direct review of the
FDA's interpretation. A reviewing court would be struck by the "varying,
inconsistent positions" taken by the FDA.'54 As Judge Chin observed, "The
FDA's conduct in this case has indeed been perplexing. It shifted its
position in a manner that has prejudiced Watson. It refuses now to take into
account copyright consideration, when it has previously suggested that it
ought to take copyrights considerations into account." ' Such flip-flopping
would result in significantly less deference to the FDA. Although it is true
that the Supreme Court "has rejected the argument that an agency's
interpretation 'is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp break
with prior interpretations' of the statute in question,"'56 such a change must
be "amply justified"'5 7 with a "reasoned analysis."'' 8 Moreover, an "agency
interpretation of a relevant provision that conflicts with the agency's earlier
interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently
151. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214
1999 WL 1243894, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999).
152. Cf. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens,
J.); Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 343, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ("[Ilt would be a
relief if manufacturers of deodorants, cooking utensils, and other products would stop claiming
copyright protection for the descriptive components of their labels, pamphlets and other instructional
materials. Nine times out of ten copyright law will not protect that sort of literature ... .
153. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 29.
154. SmithKline, 1999 WL 1243894, at *2.
155. Id. at *6.
156. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862).
157. Id. at 187.
158. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983).
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held agency view."'59 In sum, "the consistency of an agency's position is a
factor in assessing the weight that position is due."" The FDA's position in
SmithKline was anything but consistent. To support its position, FDA must
come forward with more than hortatory statements about the public interest,
the lack of congressional mandates, and minor administrative inconvenience.
Short of demonstrating that a contrary interpretation would shut down
generic drug approval, probably FDA would not have prevailed. A
reviewing court seeking to reconcile the Hatch-Waxman Act and copyright
laws would reject FDA's interpretation as an illegitimate attempt to
essentially appropriate SmithKline's copyright.
Ultimately, FDA's position should be seen for what it is - nothing short
of an appropriation of copyrighted labels. Under an interpretation where
Hatch-Waxman trumps the copyright laws, it is FDA, through its NDA
approval power, rather than the copyright holder who would "license" the
copyrighted label and supplementary materials for use by generics, with no
benefit to the copyright holder. Certainly, there are many legitimate
circumstances where FDA may limit or restrict the use of intellectual
property by its owner. However, we should be more skeptical of those
situations in which FDA can be said to have appropriated that intellectual
property. In Part II, we will explore the limitations on intellectual property
rights imposed by the FDA and its organic statute, and to a lesser extent
other administrative agencies, distinguishing between cases of restriction
and appropriation, and inquiring into the legitimacy of these limitations.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE MERCY OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
If the FDA's decisions leading up to SmithKline were isolated examples
of agency power to limit and restrict intellectual property rights, then one
should ask, "What's the big deal?" However, the FDA's effective
appropriation of copyrighted labels in the ANDA context is but the tip of the
iceberg. Congress has given broad authority to the FDA and other federal
agencies in a number of settings to appropriate data, formulations, and other
intellectual property from the developers and to provide this information to
competitors. 6 ' Similarly agencies have taken it upon themselves to
unilaterally disclose intellectual assets under certain circumstances.'62 In
159. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 n.30 (1987) (internal quotations omitted).
160. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402,417 (1993).
161. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000), 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(2000)) ("Hatch-Waxman" Act); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ I 36a(c)(1)(D) (2000).
162. See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Public Information and Public Participation in the Food and
Drug Administration, 36 Q. BULL. Ass'N FOOD & DRUG OFFICIALS 212 (1972), reprinted in HUTr
& MERRILL, supra note 129, at 1299-1300 [hereinafter Hutt, Public Information]; 21 C.F.R. §§
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some cases, the FDA has claimed the authority to regulate assets, such as
trade names, out of existence altogether.'63 It is not the purpose of this
Article to catalog all of the areas where the FDA, much less other
administrative agencies, compromise the intellectual property of those it is
charged with regulating. Rather, this Part seeks only to demonstrate that
such impingement (if not infringement) is pervasive in the modem
administrative state - particularly in the FDA.
A. The Hatch- Waxman Regime
In the patent context, the most widely heralded legislative regime to
limit and redistribute patent protection is the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,'" commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act. The Act created a regulatory mechanism to reduce the delay
in FDA approval of generic versions of drugs already approved for market."'
If it can be shown that "the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling proposed for the new drug have been previously
approved for a [listed] drug,"'66 the new drug applicant need only file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"). The Act delineates the
requirements for an ANDA and effectively exempts an ANDA applicant
from having to perform the exhaustive clinical studies required for a
standard new drug application. Instead, the applicant need only show, for
example, that the "bioequivalen[ce]," "labeling," "route of administration,
the dosage form, and the strength of the new drug are the same as those of
the listed drug""'6 to obtain FDA approval. However, the generic drug
company is not just allowed to use the patented drug company's drug and
supporting data - it is allowed to do this before the patent has expired.
Actions now held exempt from infringement under 35 U.S.C. section
20.61 (2001) (new drug applications), 812.38 (2001) (medical devices), 514.11 (2001) (animal
drugs).
163. See, e.g., Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1041-42 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 101) (suggesting that the FDA could "prohibit the use of specific terms
that now appear in product names, trademarks, trade names, symbols and company logos")
[hereinafter Dietary Supplements Regulations]; United States v. 702 Dozen Bottles, and 761/2 Dozen
Bottles of "666," Civ. No. 112, 114 (M.D. Ga. 1945) (Deaver, J., instructing the jury), reprinted in
VINCENT A. KLEINFELD & CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 1938-1949, at 89 [hereinafter U.S. v. 70 Dozen Bottles
"666"].
164. Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. § 301, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(2000)).
165. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).
166. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
167. Id. § 355()(2)(A)(iii) - (v).
271(e)(1) were held to have infringed a valid patent under section 271(a)
prior to Hatch-Waxman.' 6' The Act prevents "[p]atent litigation ... until
after the generic manufacturer has at least demonstrated a legitimate interest
in a drug by investment in preparing a complete ANDA."' 69 The bill created
a moratorium on suits for experimental use that could have been brought
under Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical, Inc.,' 7° pursuant to
section 271(a), until after the competitor files an ANDA.
The patent holder is not left without any recourse because the ANDA
applicant must make one of four certifications as to the status of any patent
"which claims the listed drug.., or which claims a use for such listed drug
for which the applicant is seeking approval.'' Three of these
certifications-that there is no patent, that any relevant patents have expired,
or simply asking for approval contingent upon the expiration of the patent-
raise no special issues, as there would have been no patent infringement
prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act. 71 It is the final certification, the so-called
paragraph IV certification, "that such patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted,"'73 that invokes the amended patent laws. If the
patent is valid or will be infringed by such manufacture, use, or sale, then
filing the certification is itself an act of patent infringement under section
271(e).174 Thus, patent infringement in an ANDA case is distinct from other
types of patent infringement and is defined separately from other acts in
infringement in 35 U.S.C. section 271.' 7' The Federal Circuit has held that
filing a paragraph IV certification is enough to give patentees the right to sue
the applicant under section 271(e).'76 An ANDA applicant is subject to suit
for patent infringement merely by filing a paragraph IV certification: the
applicant need not make, use, or offer to sell or sell any patented invention.1
7
168. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
169. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 61 (1984).
170. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
171. 21 U.S.C. § 3550j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000).
172. See id. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii)(1) - (Il).
173. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 271(i)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). Section 271(e)(2)(A) provides:
It shall be an act of infringement to submit-(A) an application under section 505(j) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act[, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j),] or described
in section [355(b)(2)] of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is
claimed in a patent ... if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such
Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug ... claimed in a
patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.
Id.
175. Id.
176. See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[S]ection
271(e)(2) provide[s] patentees with a defined act of infringement sufficient to create case or
controversy jurisdiction to enable a court to promptly resolve any dispute concerning infringement
and validity.").
177. See id.
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Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, "if the generic obtains approval and goes
on the market before the patent expires, then the patent holder can sue for
patent infringement.""'7 In contrast, now
The provisions of the bill.., modify this rule by providing that if a
generic files for approval and requested marketing authority during
the life of the patent that the FDA cannot act immediately .... The
generic must also notify the patent holder. The patent holder must
then commence litigation within forty-five days to assert the
validity of the patent [in order to obtain a thirty-month injunction
against FDA approval]. 79
Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the patent-holder a right to a thirty-
month injunction preventing FDA approval of a generic that arguably
infringes. However, the patentee lost the right to sue someone using their
patented drug for research and other uses "reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."'8
The proponents of the Hatch-Waxman Act urged its adoption "as the
best possible compromise between two competing economic interests.'""' In
addition to the ANDA provisions, the Act also provided for "patent term
extension,"'82 this increasing the life of the patent beyond seventeen years -
particularly for those patent holders whose marketing of their patented
product had been held up by FDA approval. Despite this "exchange of
property interests" 18' it is clear that patent holders have lost significant rights
to competitors through the Hatch-Waxman regime.
As one court noted, "Congress made a fully self-conscious choice
between two directly competing interests: continuing full protection and the
rights of patent holders, on the one hand, and on the other, assuring access
by the public to medically beneficial new products at truly competitive
market prices (i.e., lower prices) . . . .""' That court concluded that "[i]n
essence, Congress elevated the health care interests of the public above the
pecuniary interests of the patent holders.""'8 Certainly, as a matter of public
policy, promoting public health is a laudable goal, but it should be frankly
178. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9 (1984).
179. Id.
180. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
181. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 7 (1984).
182. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-156(2000).
183. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at n.20 (1984).
184. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
185. Id. at 1276-77.
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recognized that in this case it came at a cost to IP rights, which itself creates
social costs. The Intermedics court acknowledged the negative impacts on
patent holders:
Congress reduced the scope of the rights of patent holders in two
significant respects. First it permitted potential competitors, during
the life of the patent, to engage in acts that otherwise clearly would
constitute acts of infringement, as long as those acts generated data
the FDA would use in deciding whether to approve a product for the
commercial marketplace. Since Congress knew that the FDA
sometimes required data based on considerable use of a product,
Congress knew that creating this protection would deprive patent
holders of sales that might well be significant .... The second
negative impact on the interests of patent holders that Congress
effected through the adoption of § 271(e)(1) was arguably even
more significant. Under the scenarios that would have [been]
obtained under Roche, a competitor could not have begun
generating data for the FDA until after the expiration of the patent
[thus effectively adding] several years of life to patents by making it
impossible for competitors to be ready to enter the commercial
marketplace in any significant measure for several years after the
formal expiration of the patent holder's rights.'86
Thus, courts acknowledge that Congress made "hard choices" in enacting
the Hatch-Waxman regime. 7
In accepting these "hard choices," courts have also gone on to give
section 271(e)(1) an especially broad reading. For example, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, the Hatch-Waxman Act infringement exception
applies not just to individual provisions of federal law regulating "drug-
related inventions," but rather to the entirety of any federal law, including
the FDCA, at least some of whose provisions regulate drugs. 8  In
determining that Congress "used the word 'law' in its broader sense," the
Court found that section 271(e)(1) also applies to medical devices that are
subject to FDA approval.'89 Further, lower courts interpreting Eli Lilly and
applying the section 271(e)(1) exception have held that it is not lost just
because some of the non-infringing uses (i.e. those reasonably related to
gaining FDA approval to market) also double as "uses" that fall outside
those permitted by the statute.'90 There has been a "reluctance to conclude
that Congress intended the courts, when construing [section 271(e)(1)] to
186. Id. at 1277.
187. Id.
188. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1990).
189. Id. at 667.
190. See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1278-79.
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ascribe much (or any) significance either to the indirect (ripple) effects of a
defendant's otherwise infringing activities, or to inferences about
'purposes"' in engaging in certain conduct. 9 ' Thus interpreted, the Hatch-
Waxman Act's infringement exception can grow beyond a mere
experimental use exception.92 Indeed, there has been slippage for patent-
holders' rights. For example, the Intermedics court suggested, "[P]otential
competitors foreseeably must engage in considerable 'business'
development and promotion activity just to meet the FDA's requirements."'93
So long as any acts can be "'reasonably related to the development and
submission of information' to the FDA," additional business purposes are
disregarded and there is no infringement.'94 Taking this approach to its
logical conclusion, the Intermedics court determined that trade show
demonstrations of an allegedly infringing medical device were not acts of
infringement because a "reasonable trier of fact would be compelled to
conclude that at least some of [the alleged infringer's] demonstration activity
was reasonably related to identifying potential clinical investigators and,
therefore, to generating data for submission to the FDA."'95 This "House-
that-Jack-built" approach to the section 271(e)(1) exception threatens to
balloon a limited exception into a loophole for generic manufacturers to
effectively begin marketing products and to secure future market share even
before a patent has expired. Although expanding the Hatch-Waxman
infringement exception may ultimately be good for the consumer, it must be
acknowledged that it cheapens the intellectual property rights of the pioneer
developer.
B. Required Disclosure
The patent and copyright laws are not the only regimes under which the
owner of an intellectual asset is required to disclose the contents of that
asset. What makes them unique is that in exchange for disclosure, the owner
receives the federally-protected right to exclusivity (including the right to
license or not to license) over the asset. However, there are other regimes
employed by the FDA and Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under
which the asset owner must disclose and lose the exclusive rights to the asset
191. Id. at 1279.
192. For a discussion of an experimental use exception to the pre-Roche and pre-Hatch-Waxman
patent laws, see Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF.
SoC'y 357, 360 (1957).
193. Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1279.
194. Id. at 1280.
195. Id. at 1287.
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in order to be allowed to use the asset. Thus, these innovations are not only
left unprotected, they are actually affirmatively revealed to competitors. In
some cases there is compensation for competitors' use, but in others, the
only compensation is the privilege of using the innovation.
One such regime.is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA")."'" FIFRA requires premarket approval ("registration") of all
pesticides distributed or sold in the United States.'97 Such registration data
must be disclosed by the pioneer manufacturer to EPA for use by subsequent
generic (or "me too") manufacturers."'" The pioneer has no discretion in who
may subsequently use its data. Nonetheless, in some instances the "me too"
manufacturer must compensate the originator of the use of the data.'
Indeed, when there are disputes over data compensation they may be subject
to compulsory arbitration.0" An original data submitter who refuses to
participate in an arbitration proceeding forfeits the right to compensation."2 '
Nonetheless, the "me too" applicant is only required to pay "reasonable
compensation for producing the test data to be relied upon," ' 2 rather than
full compensation for the competitive injury flowing from disclosure."'
There are limits to the data which EPA is allowed to disclose under
FIFRA. Although Congress intended to provide consumers and competing
pesticide manufacturers access to scientific data in the 1972 amendments to
FIFRA,"" it originally excluded trade secrets from public disclosure.2 5 Thus,
while the act provided for "mandatory licensing" of some test data, it
excluded data that would fall under the trade secrets act. :" The pioneer
could mark that data it believed to be a trade secret, and the EPA was to
determine what information contains or relates to trade secrets.21 7 If the EPA
proposed to release data which a registrant believes to be protected, the
registrant "may institute an action in an appropriate district court for a
declaratory judgment as to whether such information is subject to
protection .... ,,2" Factors that the EPA was to consider included: "(1) the
cost of developing the data;" (2) the competitive advantage provided by the
data; "(3) the extent to which the data are not independently known or
196. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
197. Id.
198. Id. §136a(c)(1)(D).
199. 40 C.F.R. § 152E (2001).
200. 29 C.F.R. § 1440 (2001).
201. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 732, 736 (D. Del. 1980) [hereinafter Chevron
Chemical II].
202. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(D) (1994).
203. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (internal citation
omitted) [hereinafter Chevron Chemical I].
204. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (Oct. 21, 1972).
205. Chevron Chemical 1, 443 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
206. Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 552; see Chevron Chemical 1, 443 F. Supp. at 1029.
207. See Chevron Chemical 1, 443 F. Supp. at 1029.
208. Id.
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available to others; and (4) the extent to which the owner has maintained
their confidentiality. '2'0 However, after several series of amendments
FIFRA was again amended in 1978 to eliminate the prohibition against EPA
considering data classified as trade secrets.20  Data submitted after
September 30, 1978 was given a ten-year period of exclusive use, in which
the EPA could not consider that data in conjunction with a "me too"
applicant.2 1'  Following the ten years of exclusivity, there is a five-year
window in which the originator is compensated for use of the data.2 2 Data
submitted after December 31, 1969 (but prior to September 20, 1978) was
given a fifteen-year window in which it could be used without permission,
but only if there was reasonable compensation."3 As it currently stands, the
FIFRA regime provides new registrants with a ten-year window of
exclusivity, after which they have no protection for data which might be
considered trade secrets and which could still provide a competitive
advantage.
The FDA also oversees regimes in which there is no effective
compensation for disclosure. For example, food additives2 ' and color
additives,"' are subject to public regulations, rather than private licenses, and
"thus permit any person to engage in their manufacture."2 6 In these areas of
public regulation under which any firm can market its own product the FDA
reasoned that scientific data provided by applicants provided no competitive
advantage and could be disclosed to the public immediately upon
promulgation of the regulation.27 Because the FDA essentially promulgates
definitions of food and color additives when it approves or
"lists" them, those firms that pioneer new additives are unable to sustain any
competitive advantage. Their new additive must be made public in order for
it to even be marketed. 8
209. Id. at 1031 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (trade secrets)).
210. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. 95-396, 92 Stat. 820 (Sept. 30,
1978); see also Chevron Chemical 11, 499 F. Supp. at 735.
211. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(i) (2000).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii). The FIFRA regime was challenged as a taking of property without
just compensation, and as a taking for private use rather than for public use, both in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The challenge was
partially successful for a limited set of claims, but left the FIFRA framework in place. Id. Takings
claims as a means of protecting intellectual property rights and the Ruckelshaus case will be
discussed in Part IV, infra.
214. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2000).
215. 21 U.S.C. § 376 (2000).
216. Hutt, Public Information, supra note 162, at 1300.
217. HUrT & MERRILL, supra note 129, at 1301.
218. Until 1997 antibiotics were treated the same way. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1994), repealed by The
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C. Unilateral Disclosure
In addition to products subject to public regulations, the FDA makes
vast quantities of privately generated data available pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA").2 9 As former FDA Chief Counsel Peter Hutt
observed in proposing FDA's public information regulations in 1972:
The Food and Drug Administration is the largest repository of
private scientific research in the world. [It] receive[s] mountains of
important data and information on the safety, effectiveness, and
functionality of foods and drugs, and undoubtedly will soon be
receiving the same type of information for devices and cosmetics,
that is available nowhere else. Since 1938, virtually none of it has
been divulged. It is now proposed, however, that most of it will
become available for public disclosure upon request.22
The FDA's original public inforrhation regulations were implemented in
1972, and have been subsequently amended."2 What made the FDA's
decision controversial was concern that there were inadequate safeguards to
protect the confidentiality of information that genuinely could be regarded as
trade secrets, such that disclosure would harm the competitive advantage of
the data provider. One difficulty is, of course, defining "trade secret.""22
FDA's definition of "trade secrets and commercial or financial information"
relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts.22 The D.C. Circuit defined
trade secret as "a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or
device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, § 125 (1997). Under section 125 of the
Modernization Act, antibiotics are now subject to the New Drug Application requirements of 21
U.S.C. § 355, that apply generally to new drugs. id.
219. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
220. Hutt, Public Information, supra note 162, at 1300. As adopted, the policy of the FDA is to
"make the fullest possible disclosure of records to the public, consistent with the rights of individuals
to privacy, the property rights of persons in trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial
information, and the need for the agency to promote frank internal policy deliberations and to pursue
its regulatory activities without disruption." 21 C.F.R. § 20.20(a) (2000).
221. 37 Fed. Reg. 9128 (May 5, 1972) (codified as amended in 21 C.F.R. pt. 20).
222. See, e.g., Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Young, 830 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir 1987); Zotos Int'l, Inc. v.
Kennedy, 460 F. Supp. 268 (D.D.C. 1978).
223. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (2000) stating:
(a) A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
(b) Commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential means valuable
data or information which is used in one's business and is of a type customarily held in
strict confidence and regarded as privileged and not disclosed to any member of the
public by the person to whom it belongs.)
Id. Data and information submitted or divulged to the FDA "which fall within the definitions of a
trade secret or confidential or financial information are not available for public disclosure." Id. §
20.61 (c).
468
[Vol. 29: 435, 2002] Protecting Private Intellectual Property
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either
innovation or substantial effort. 224
FDA's broad approach to data disclosure, set out in 21 C.F.R. Part 20,
raises concerns that even trade secrets may be disclosed within the
"mountains" of non-confidential data. Unlike other agencies that reluctantly
acknowledged some FOIA access rights to submitted data, FDA designed
and imposed a system "in which access is the norm and confidential status
the exception.""22 This presumption of access makes it even more likely that
trade secrets may fall into the hands of competitors, despite FDA's
commitment to protect trade secrets and other confidential information from
public disclosure.226 As one commentator observed, the "role of FDA's
career officials in handling FOIA matters unfortunately has involved a
history of antagonism toward the views of commercial submitters of
confidential data. Because so much of the data submitted to the NDA
review process is valuable, industry has pressed repeatedly for better
protection and better systems for accounting for confidential research
data ... "227 The FDA position has historically (since the 1970's) been one
of viewing disclosure as the "preferred outcome of disputes about
information on new drugs." '228 Although FDA provides for exemptions from
disclosure for trade secrets and other confidential information, FDA has
made the "policy choice" to stop companies from claiming trade secret
status for case reports and data summaries, and has obtained legal victories
supporting this pro-disclosure stance.22'
In some instances, the only recourse available to a data owner is to sue
the FDA to prevent disclosure. To prevail, the challenger must show that
FDA acted arbitrarily in its decision to disclose the data, a high standard to
meet.' However, first the data owner must be aware of intended disclosure.
Prior to 1989 there was no requirement that data owners be informed of all
releases. Nonetheless, where data had been marked confidential, but the
FDA determined "the confidentiality of data or information is uncertain," the
224. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
225. James T. O'Reilly, Implications of International Drug Approval Systems on Confidentiality
of Business Secrets in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 123, 128 (1998).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 129; see also Gary Yingling, Veterinary Drugs: The Impact of the Laws of
Confidentiality on International Communications, 38 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 35 (1983).
229. See Pub. Citizen Health, 704 F.2d at 1281; Anderson v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
907 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1990). The exemptions are laid out in 21 C.F.R. Part 20.D. A person may
designate part or all of the information in in submitted records as exempt. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(d)
(2001).
230. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Those objecting to disclosure are
permitted to bring suit pursuant as explained in 21 C.F.R. § 20.46 (2001).
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FDA would "consult with the person who has submitted or divulged the
data." 3' In those circumstances where the FDA rejects the request for
confidentiality the data owner is given five days to institute suit in federal
district court-and if she does file suit, "the [FDA] will not disclose the
records involved until the matter and all related appeals have been
concluded." '232 Moreover, where the data submitter has marked information
as confidential and the FDA receives a request for that data, the agency "will
make reasonable efforts to notify the submitter," who has five working days
from receipt of notice to object to disclosure.3 If the requesting party then
sues for disclosure under the FOIA, the FDA will notify the data submitter,
who may intervene.
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association sought to require the
FDA to "provide notice to an affected drug company of any proposed
release of information" pursuant to FOIA "in order to provide an
opportunity for the affected company to consult with the FDA concerning
the propriety of the release of said information, and to provide an
opportunity for judicial review of the FDA's decision." '234 However, the D.C.
federal district court rejected the argument that the "FDA must notify the
drug companies of the proposed release of any and all information which
they submitted or which concerns them before it is actually released." '235 Pre-
disclosure notification was only finally required after the first President
Bush signed an executive order that ordered federal agencies to inform
companies of the agency's intent to disclose prior to actual disclosure.236 One
critic of the FDA's disclosure policies urges giving even "more notice to
industrial submitters"2" and suggests that the FDA take a more receptive
approach to requests for confidential handling and prior notification before
release of information. 38 In the meantime, protection of trade secrets in data
reported to the FDA largely remains at the discretion of the agency, though
within the parameters its has set out in 21 C.F.R. Part 20.
231. 21 C.F.R. § 20.45 (2001).
232. Id. § 20.46.
233. Id. § 20.61.
234. Pharms. Mfr. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 445 (D.D.C. 1975) (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). The court reasoned: "If there is no right to nondisclosure under
the F.O.I.A., the Court does not perceive how there could be a right, under the F.O.I.A., to notice
before a decision regarding nondisclosure is made." Id. at 448.
236. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (Feb. 25, 1989).
237. See O'Reilly, supra note 225, at 131.
238. See id. FDA has expressed "antipathy" to presubmission requests for confidential handling.
See id.; 21 C.F.R. § 20.44 (2000) ("No [presubmission] request.., shall be accepted if the status of
the records involved is already determined by § 20.111 or by any other regulation [in part 20]"); id. §
20.111 (allowing for public disclosure of certain data and information submitted voluntarily to the
FDA); Carson Prods., Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979).
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D. IP Regulated Away
The FDA's administrative actions with respect to intellectual property
have not been limited to appropriation and dissemination. The FDA has the
authority to regulate many intellectual assets effectively out of use.
Certainly there is nothing novel about a regulatory agency imposing limits
on one's intellectual asset. The patent grant, for example, does not give the
right to make or use one's invention, but merely to exclude others from using
it.23 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires that new drugs,
patented or otherwise, be approved for use by the FDA prior to "introduction
into interstate commerce." 40 Thus, to suggest that the FDA can effectively
prevent manufacturers from using or profiting from their intellectual
property is wholly unremarkable. What is remarkable is the breadth of IP
over which the FDA at least purports to exercise regulatory authority.
In conjunction with its authority to regulate labeling claims,"' the FDA
purports to be empowered to regulate or prohibit the "use of specific terms
that now appear in product names, trademarks, trade names, symbols, and
company logos.. ,,"" In the case of dietary supplements. 3 the FDA
position, based on 21 U.S.C. § 343®(6), is that if manufacturers "wish to
continue using trademarks and trade names that imply a disease claim, they
may do so, provided that they first meet the safety and efficacy standards
and other regulatory requirements applicable to drugs or, in appropriate
cases, provided that they obtain authorization to make a health claim." '4
However, it is worth noting that the FDA emphasized that this regulation
239. See CHISUM, ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 2-5 (1998).
240. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
241. Id. §§ 343 ("Misbranded food"), 352 ("Misbranded drugs and devices"), 362 ("Misbranded
cosmetics").
242. Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1041.
243. The battles over regulation of dietary supplements were ultimately taken to Capitol Hill
where the FDA suffered an embarrassing defeat. Congress enacted the Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act of 1994 ("DSHEA"), which "created a new regime for the regulation of dietary
supplements." Id. These products had previously been regulated either as foods or as drugs - those
for which a health related claim was made were regulated as drugs. The DSHEA effectively carved
dietary supplements out from drugs and left them only subject to FDA's general oversight of foods.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1), 343(r)(6), 343-2 (2000). A dietary supplement manufacturer who
wished to make a statement permitted under § 343(r)(6) need not obtain prior review of the
statement. The statement need only be truthful and not misleading, and must include a disclaimer:
"This statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not
intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease." Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra
note 163, at 1001-02. However, if the dietary supplement manufacturer includes a claim that is
related to disease (i.e., a claim to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease), then the
supplement requires prior approval as a drug or prior authorization for a health claim.
244. Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1042.
would not disadvantage some manufacturers over others.245 "[R]ather, all
manufacturers will be precluded from using trademarks and trade names that
contain an implied disease claim unless they have obtained new drug
approval or health claim authorization. Thus, manufacturers will not suffer
any competitive injury."2 '6 Nonetheless, FDA can have a say in restricting
the name of one's product-no matter the investment and marketing that
may have previously gone into that name or the good will that may be
associated with it.
FDA's willingness to restrict the use of trademarked names is not
newfound. In 1945, federal prosecutors seized several dozen bottles of the
product "666," manufactured by the Monticello Drug Company on the
ground that it was misbranded. 47 The product was misbranded because its
"name, appearance, cartons, etc., created in the minds of purchasers the
impression that the article was the product which had formerly sold as a
treatment for malaria and had contained quinine, whereas the article no
longer contained quinine." 8 The jury was charged to consider whether an
average member of the buying public would be misled by the product's
packaging, color, and name, into believing that the new product had the
attributes of the old.2 49 Thus, if the average consumer would believe the
product still contained quinine and thus had the properties of the old
product, it would be misbranded as a drug. The jury returned a verdict for
the government, and judgment was entered condemning the product.250
What is interesting to note about the "666" case is what was not at
stake. The judge was quick to instruct the jury that the "666" trademark was
not itself being attacked. "[C]ertainly the old product of 666, when [World
War II] is over and the ingredients can be obtained for that product, can be
manufactured and again put on the market for people with malaria ...""'
The restriction on the trademark was merely its use on a different product,
rather than an outright prohibition of the mark. In the "666" case, just as in
the dietary supplements disease claim regulations, the prohibition did not
deny the owner all economically viable use of the mark or name. Moreover,
these kinds of restrictions "will not allow one manufacturer to use another's
trademark or trade name,2 52 nor is the government taking the "trademark or
trade name for its own use.
2 53
These kinds of restrictions on the use of intellectual property will, as the
FDA concluded with respect to the dietary supplement regulations, rarely (if
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. See U.S. v. 702 Dozen Bottles "666," supra note 163, at 89,
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 93.
251. Id. at 91.
252. Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1042.
253. Id.
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ever) rise to the level of a constitutional "taking" under the Fifth
Amendment2  Nonetheless, other FDA regulations, particularly those that
do allow one manufacturer to use another's intellectual assets may present
legitimate claims of a taking. That is the topic explored in Part IV. Before
considering when appropriations of intellectual property, such as in
SmithKline, may be constitutional takings, it is important to explore in Part
III the recent cases that allow states to appropriate and infringe intellectual
property rights and restrict Congress' ability to protect IP rights. Then in
Part IV we may consider whether a takings theory of infringement would
also apply to the states.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE MERCY OF THE SOVEREIGN STATES
If SmithKline represents a judicial. willingness to sacrifice intellectual
property rights on the altar of administrative deference, then it should be
viewed alongside recent cases in which the courts have commanded
deference to states' rights. These cases, Florida Prepaid,255 Chavez v. Arte
Publico Press,56 and College Savings,57 curtailed federal intellectual
property protection against the states on the ground that the protections were
beyond the scope of Congress' constitutional powers. Similarly, the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998,5"' which extended copyright
protection for existing and future copyrights by an additional twenty years,
survived a recent scare2 9 in which one judge on a three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit argued that the extension
was beyond the scope of Congress' power under the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution." The purpose of this Part is not to address the
merits of the doctrinal underpinnings of these decisions. For example, the
sovereign immunity jurisprudence of the current five-to-four majority on the
Supreme Court may well be correct, and if so, then it would be anomalous
for it not to apply to federal intellectual property protections as much as any
254. See id. at 1041-43.
255. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
256. 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
257. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
258. Pub L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000).
259. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert granted No. 01-618, 70 U.S.L.W. 3292 (Feb, 25, 2002).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part).
Judge Sentelle, joined by Judge Tatel, also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). The fate of the Act is still an open question as the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, 70 U.S.L.W. 3292 (Feb. 25, 2002).
other congressional enactment.26' Nonetheless, that does not make the real-
world reduction of IP protection any less significant. Therefore, this Part
will address these recent decisions and the scope of their effect on IP rights
as applied against the states. Part IV will explore a takings theory of
infringement, which could enhance or ensure intellectual property protection
against both the federal and state governments.
A. The Effect of Sovereign Immunity on Intellectual Property
In some ways, IP rights may be the victims of "friendly fire" in the
current doctrinal conflict over the proper scope of state sovereign immunity
raging in the United States Supreme Court. 62 The majority, which struck
down the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act263
(amending the patent laws to expressly abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity), consists of the same justices who have led the charge to restore
(or enhance, depending on your point of view) private property rights under
the federal Constitution." The Act provided that:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his
official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by
any person.., for infringement of a patent under section 27 1, or for
any other violation under this title.
Congress justified the Act under three sources of constitutional authority:
The Patent and Copyright Clause,266 the Commerce Clause2 and Section
261. One commentator suggests that applying sovereign immunity in intellectual property cases
may not produce "odd" or "unjust" results at all. See Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and
Intellectual Property, 73 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2000).
262. Every sovereign immunity decision, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000), has been decided by a five-to-four vote, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, comprising the majority and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer in dissent.
263. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000).
264. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
With the exception of Nollan, which pre-dates Justice Thomas's tenure on the court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have consistently been in the
majority in these and other "property rights" cases. In Part IV.D, I will examine how Florida
Prepaid brought two of the major jurisprudential "projects" of the Rehnquist Court into conflict:
states' rights and property rights.
265. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (2000).
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 8.
267. ld. at cl. 3.
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Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 8 However, the Florida Prepaid Court
held that, as Seminole Tribe269 "makes clear," Congress "may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers." 7' Therefore the
Patent Remedy Act could not be sustained either under the Commerce
Clause or the Patent and Copyright Clause. The only remaining ground for
sustaining the act was Congress' remedial powers under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which have been held to explicitly abrogate state
sovereign immunity. 7'
Before examining the justifications offered and rejected for abrogation
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth pausing to allow the
Court's pronouncement on the Patent and Copyright Clause to sink in.
Under the Court's reasoning, Congress has no affirmative power to protect
patents and copyrights from state infringement, only a remedial power,
which did not even exist until the passage of the Civil War Amendments.
This is despite the fact that the "Constitution vests Congress with plenary
authority over patents and copyrights" and that "[n]early 200 years ago,
Congress provided for exclusive jurisdiction of patent infringement litigation
in the federal courts." '  This heretofore unrecognized (or unlitigated)
limitation on patent rights is breathtaking to consider. James Madison
defended the Patent and Copyright Clause stating: "The utility of this power
will scarcely be questioned .... The States cannot separately make effectual
provision for either [patents or copyrights], and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of
Congress. 273 Similarly, no less of a constitutional authority than Justice
Story said of the Patent and Copyright clause: "It is beneficial to all parties,
that the national government should possess this power ... because,
otherwise, [authors and inventors] would be subjected to the varying laws
and systems of the different states on this subject, which would impair, and
might even destroy the value of their rights."74 Thus, there is historic
recognition of the need for a national, uniform patent and copyright system.
Given this history, it is somewhat remarkable to discover, at the turn of
the Millennium, that the states themselves were originally exempted from
this system. Whether a principled distinction could be drawn between
268. Id. at amend. XIV, § 5.
269. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
270. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999).
271. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
272. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 267 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1908).
274. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 402, § 502
(Rotunda & Nowak eds., 1987).
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Congress' power to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Patent and
Copyright Clause, but not the Commerce Clause, is a question for others to
ponder. Nonetheless, where states have no power to act,275 and whenever
state autonomy or "state sovereignty does not limit national authority to
impose certain obligations on the states-for example, to prohibit them from
infringing people's patents or copyrights.. .- then what independent value
of federalism is served by inserting sovereign immunity as an additional
barrier to effective enforcement of these obligations?" '276
Turning to Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment,
"appropriate" legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate state sovereignty. The question is
what constitutes "appropriate" legislation. The Court addressed the scope of
Section Five in City of Boerne v. Flores." ' "There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."'278 To exercise the remedial powers of Section
Five, Congress must "identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme
to remedying or preventing such conduct." '279 In the case of the Patent
Remedy Act, the underlying conduct at issue is state infringement of patents
and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation. 8'
The Court concluded, "Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement
by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."2 ' Rather, the
legislative history indicated that "states are willing and able to respect patent
rights" and that Congress did "not have any evidence of massive or
widespread violation of patent laws by the States either with or without this
State immunity." 82 Based on this lack of evidence, and determining that
275. Arguably, under the Constitution itself, states have no power to issue patents, copyrights and
the like, as the Patent and Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to secure "for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). For this to be an exclusive right, it has to be solely
Congress' to grant. By contrast, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not have any explicit mention
of exclusivity. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The "exclusivity" has arisen from the so-called
"dormant Commerce Clause" jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Thus, perhaps the text of the two sources of
congressional power suggests the basis for a principled distinction - but that is a matter for others to
consider.
276. David L. Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: What is Good Federalism?, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 754-
55 (2000). Professor Shapiro responds to his rhetorical question: "The answer, I believe, is none,
and indeed a contrary answer strikes me as incompatible with the basic notion not only of a
government of law but of a government under law." Id. at 755.
277. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
278. Id. at 520.
279. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999).
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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Congress only viewed state remedies to infringement "less convenient than
federal remedies" rather than "constitutionally inadequate," '283 the Court
found that the Patent Remedy Act did not "respond to a history of
'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort
congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation."2" As the
provisions could not be understood as remedial, they could not be
sustained.28 Further, even if they were remedial, the scope of the Act was
too broad - as the scope of infringement reaches negligent and induced
infringement, regardless of intent. 86 Such actions do not "deprive" a person
of "property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause."2"7 Thus, the
upshot of Florida Prepaid is that some states will be able to infringe patent
rights with impunity until it rises to a level deserving of "remedial" action
by Congress. Even then, patent holders may have to settle for a state forum,
despite the interests in uniformity that led to the creation of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 8 Finally, states can never be
forced to comply with the entirety of the patent laws as not all statutory acts
of infringement would rise to the level of constitutional violations if
committed by a state. Make no mistake, Florida Prepaid cuts deep into the
heart of patent protection against state infringers.
The Florida Prepaid decision on the Patent Remedy Act has already
spawned progeny. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,289 which involved
Congress' attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity for copyright
infringement and violations of the Lanham Act, 290 was considered no fewer
than three times by a panel of the Fifth Circuit due to remands from the
United States Supreme Court following Seminole Tribe, and from the en
banc Fifth Circuit following Florida Prepaid.9' Ultimately, the IP owner
lost.
283. Id. at 644.
284. Id. at 645.
285. See id. at 646-48.
286. See id. at 644-45.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Chavez III].
290. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 511 (2000); Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1125(a) (2000).
291. Another panel of the Fifth Circuit summarily applied the Supreme Court's decision in
Florida Prepaid to the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and affirmed the judgment of the district
court that the lawsuit against the state could not be sustained in light of Florida Prepaid. See
Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the language and
reasoning in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act was nearly identical to that in the Patent
Remedy Act).
The plaintiff in Chavez sued the University of Houston for infringing
her copyright by continuing to publish her book without her consent.
Although this was clearly a violation of a property interest,292 the court held a
cause of action in federal court could not be justified pursuant to Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the fact that the legislative
history for the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act documented "a few
more instances of copyright infringement than the [Patent Remedy Act]
legislative history did of patent violations" the Fifth Circuit found that the
Copyright Remedy "exhibit[ed] similar deficiencies." '293 There was no
"evidence of a pattern of unremedied copyright infringement by the States;"
rather, "Congress worried principally about the potential for future abuse." '294
Like the Florida Prepaid Court, the Chavez court also noted that Congress
"barely considered the availability of state remedies for infringement."
29
Further, the Chavez court observed, "Congress rejected the idea of granting
state courts concurrent jurisdiction over copyright cases."296 As in Florida
Prepaid, the Court found the scope of copyright infringement to be broader
than what would be constitutional violations, because "[c]opyright
infringement actions, like those for patent infringement, ordinarily require
no showing of intent to infringe." ' Thus, we see the scope of Florida
Prepaid covers both patents and copyrights, leaving holders of these
property rights, conferred pursuant to the United States Constitution, with no
remedy save that which a state might choose to give it-assuming that such
a remedy is not preempted by the exclusive federal jurisdiction provisions of
patent and copyright laws-and certainly no guarantee of the rights
expressly conferred by Congress. The irony is that in rejecting arguments
that Congress was responding to concerns over the potential for future abuse
by the states, these decisions may usher in such abuse at a time when such
property rights are becoming increasingly central to innovation and the
economy.2 Given these courts' rejection of the findings of fact by Congress
in both the Patent and Copyright Remedy Clarification Acts, and similar
rejections of fact-finding in cases such as United States v. Morrison,"' it is
292. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 288 (1998) [hereinafter Chavez 11].
293. Chavez 111, 204 F.3d at 605.
294. Id. at 606.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 607.
297. Id. (emphasis added).
298. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7.
299. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Violence Against Women Act to be beyond the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause power and beyond the scope of its Enforcement Clause remedial
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding extensive findings of fact documenting
constitutional violations in at least twenty-one states and pervasive gender-based stereotypes
hampering state legal systems, sometimes constitutionally so).
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hard to imagine the scope and the extent of infringement of intellectual
property rights by the states that must occur before Congress can permissibly
respond.
B. Limits on Congress' Power to Protect Other IP From State Infringement
Florida Prepaid and Chavez represent failed attempts to regulate state
infringement of well-established intellectual property rights: patent and
copyright. There Congress had exceeded its power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the remedy was not congruent and
proportional to the alleged harm. However, following from City of
Boerne,3°° there must not only be congruence, but Congress can only be
protecting a constitutional right as defined by the Supreme Court. Congress'
remedial power is designed to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States." °' Thus, in Boerne, the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to the states, because it
imposed obligations on the states that the Free Exercise Clause (incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment) did not require.3"2 Similarly, in creating
an intellectual property rights enforceable against the states pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is limited to creating a "property right"
that is protected by the Due Process Clause.
The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act ("TRCA") subjected states to
suits brought under the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising and
misrepresentation, as well as misappropriation. ' Thus, in College Savings
the question was whether that provision was a constitutionally permissible
abrogation of state sovereign immunity or did it reach beyond the
constitutional definition of "property.'"  The plaintiff in College Savings
argued that Congress enacted the TRCA to protect two (intellectual)
property rights: "(1) a right to be free from a business competitor's false
advertising about its own product, and (2) a more generalized right to be
secure in one's business interests."3 °5 However, the Court, per Justice Scalia,
rejected them, concluding, "Neither of these qualifies as a property right
300. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
301. Id. at 508.
302. Id.
303. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
304. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 527 U.S. 666, 667
(1999).
305. Id. at 672.
protected by the Due Process Clause."3" Rather, the Court described what
would qualify as a property right:
The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others. That is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). That is why the right
that we all possess to use the public lands is not the "property" right
of anyone-hence the sardonic maxim, explaining what economists
call the "tragedy of the commons," res publica, res nullius. The
Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect
constitutionally cognizable property interests-notably, its
provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the
"property" of the owner because he can exclude others from using
them. See, e.g., K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-
186 (1988) ("Trademark law, like contract law, confers private
rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the
trademark owner a bundle of such rights"). The Lanham Act's
false-advertising provisions, however, bear no relationship to any
right to exclude; and Florida Prepaid's alleged misrepresentations
concerning its own products intruded upon no interest over which
petitioner had exclusive dominion."7
As there was "no deprivation of [constitutionally protected] property at
issue,"3"8 the Court found that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and did
not reach the proportionality analysis discussed in Part III.A., above.
College Savings thus provides a substantive limitation on Congress'
power to define property rights, and particularly more ephemeral intellectual
property rights, that may be enforced against the states in federal courts.3"
This limitation, focused on the "right to exclude," curtails Congress' ability
to create intellectual property rights. As the intellectual assets become less
like "real property," it becomes harder for Congress to provide protection
against the states. The dissent suggested that Seminole Tribe and its
progeny, such as College Savings, "threaten[] the Nation's ability to enact
economic legislation needed for the future ... .3"0 Justice Stevens, in
dissent, argued that
306. Id. at 673.
307. Id. (footnote omitted).
308. Id.
309. Congress also may not mandate that state courts open their doors to such claims. Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
310. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The activity of doing business, or the activity of making a profit, is
a form of property. The asset that often appears on a company's
balance sheet as "good will" is the substantial equivalent of that
"activity." It is the same kind of "property" that Congress described
in § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 and in § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 731. A State's deliberate destruction of a going
business is surely a deprivation of property within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause.3"'
Justice Stevens conceptualizes "property" broadly, but even a narrower
definition linked to the "right to exclude" could reach "good will" - in fact,
that is the very value of a trademark. Nearly any right can be recast as a
right to exclude. For example, a prohibition on false advertising can be
thought of as the right to exclude anyone from speaking falsely about your
product. The majority's approach, however, seems to go further than
requiring a right to exclude, but almost a quasi-tangible embodiment. Thus,
when Justice Scalia suggests that we could not have a property right in
public lands, it may be that this is driven not only by the lack of exclusion,
but also the inability to point to a particular piece and say "it is mine." The
majority approach, while setting boundaries on Congress, seems tied to
traditional conceptualizations, which may not fit intellectual property as
technology continues to develop. Justice Breyer feared that the Court's
decision
[w]ill make it more difficult for Congress to create, for example, a
decentralized system of individual private remedies, say a private
remedial system needed to protect intellectual property, including
computer-related educational materials, irrespective of the need for,
or importance of, such a system in a 21" century advanced
economy.3"
Under the majority's approach, various IP rights seem suspect (as
potentially applied to the states). For example, the exclusive right "to
prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work" 3 is particularly
hard to conceptualize. The scope of what is a "derivative work" is
potentially boundless. Unlike a patent right or the right to reproduce a
copyrighted work, the metes and bounds of the property interest are ill-
defined. A limited, traditional view of property would be hard-pressed to
311. Id. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 701-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
313. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
embrace this right. Similarly, IP rights set forth in the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990,' 4 which include the artist's right to claim authorship of the
work, to prevent the use of her name on works she did not create, and to
prevent the use of her name on works that have been modified or distorted,
as well as limited rights to object to the modification or destruction of their
original works,"5 do not fit traditional American notions of property, or
perhaps the traditional notion of the right to exclude. Were it to be applied
against the states, the objections to the definition of "property" would be
similar to those raised in College Savings. Yet, such rights, commonly
called "moral rights," which encompass protections of the "personality" of
the author/creator, have a rich tradition in continental Europe."6
The Court's reluctance to give "property" a broad definition in many
ways parallels developments in standing doctrine. In Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,3 7 the Court, again per Justice Scalia, rejected standing to challenge
administrative action under the enforcement provisions of the Endangered
Species Act3 ' in part on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not assert a
mere "procedural injury." Rather a direct and personal injury (or imminent
injury) must be shown. Of course, the Court would allow a plaintiff to seek
to enforce a procedural requirement, "the disregard of which could impair a
separate concrete interest of theirs."" 9 In College Savings, the Court is again
looking for a "concrete interest." If the reasoning in Lujan is indeed parallel,
then there is at least one member of the College Savings majority who
should be expected to consider non-traditional property interests created by
Congress. In Lujan, Justice Kennedy concurred and noted, "[W]e must be
sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear
analogs in our common-law tradition.""32 He further suggested, "Congress
has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.""2 ' If this is
314. Id. § 106A.
315. ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
483-86 (2d ed. 2000).
316. id. at 483, 543-48.
317. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
318. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
319. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572.
320. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor,
who dissented in Lujan, might also be sympathetic to such an argument.
321. Id. In the context of standing, one could imagine Congress amending the Endangered
Species Act to read: "Every citizen has a right to preservation of all species throughout the world
against threats to which actions of the United States government contribute in any way. Any citizen
may bring suit in federal court for all appropriate relief for violations of that right." RICHARD H.
FALLON, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 172
(4th ed. 1996). Similarly, Congress could give every citizen "a property right" in federally-owned
wetlands, for example. If this right were merely a right to "use" such federal public property, then
Justice Scalia's dicta in College Savings suggests that it would not meet his constitutional definition
of a property right. However, if this right included a right to exclude bulldozers, the case becomes
harder. Given Justice Kennedy's commitment to "be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of
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true, then Congress should be able to define a property interest, its bounds,
and what constitutes violations of it, in such a way that would also be
applicable to the states. Perhaps the Lanham Act's false-advertising
provisions are too ephemeral to constitute a property right, but it does not
follow that other IP rights, though new and abstract, will necessarily be
denied protection under the Due Process Clause. Even if they are, Congress
can still prohibit infringement by private actors. The Lanham Act's false-
advertising provisions, for example, are still valid, they simply cannot be
used to hold a state liable. Limitations on the meaning of "property" under
the Fourteenth Amendment will never be fatal to intellectual property rights,
only to some enforcement against the states.
C. Substantive Limits on Congress' Power to Protect Intellectual Property
1. Originality as a Constitutional Requirement for Copyright
Although the Fourteenth Amendment only limits Congress' power to
create and protect intellectual property rights as against the states, there are
other Constitutional limitations to Congress' power to create IP rights
altogether. The recent federalism-driven decisions of the Court to discern
limitations to Congress' commerce power suggest there are also limitations
to Congress' power to grant IP rights under the Patent and Copyright Clause.
These limitations, motivated by a desire to keep Congress from encroaching
upon the "reserved powers" of the sovereign states, suggested in the Tenth
Amendment, do not just apply to IP rights against the states, but to IP rights
as against private entities as well.
In the setting of copyright, a unanimous Unites States Supreme Court
announced a significant substantive constitutional limitation in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co.322 The case explored the
extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages:
at issue was whether the compilation of names, addresses, and phone
numbers was sufficiently "original" to qualify for copyright protection. It is
action," Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), one
can imagine a recognition of such a property right. Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998)
(recognizing the power of Congress to confer standing on any citizen suffering the 'injury' of
'inability to receive information' that results from another party's noncompliance with statutory
disclosure requirements). In Akins, the Court appeared to acknowledge that the interest in access to
widely-shared information would not have been actionable at common law. However, congressional
action was sufficient to confer standing. Justice Kennedy (along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) joined the opinion of Justice Breyer for the majority.
322. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
well established that "[n]o one may claim originality as to facts." '323 "This is
because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction
is one between creation and discovery: the first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its
existence.... Factual compilations on the other hand, may possess the
requisite originality." '324 In Feist, the Court made it clear that:
[O]riginality is a constitutional requirement. The source of
Congress' power to enact copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of
the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "secur[e] for limited
Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings." In two decisions from the late 19h Century... this
Court defined the crucial terms "authors" and "writings." In so
doing, the Court made it unmistakably clear that these terms
presuppose a degree of originality.325
Thus, originality circumscribes Congress's power to create intellectual
property rights under the Patent and Copyright Clause. In Feist, this meant
that raw data entries in the white pages were not copyrightable, despite the
"sweat of the brow" involved in assembling such data.326 As the Court
observed:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
may be used by others without compensation.... [H]owever, this
is not "some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is,
rather, "the essence of copyright," and a constitutional requirement.
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This principle,
known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies
to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation,
assuming the absence of original written expression, only the
compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw
323. M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.1 I[A], at 2-157 (1990).
324. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347-48.
325. Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
326. One possibility to protect "sweat of the brow" works such as databases would be legislation
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, rather than the Patent and Copyright Clause. Thus, H.R. 354
(2000) would have created "a new intellectual property right in the database itself," which would
create a cause of action for "use or extraction of individual facts from that database," while H.R.
1858 (2000) "would provide a form of unfair competition protection against those who take most or
all of a database from a database provider in order to enter into competition with that provider."
MERGES, ET. AL., supra note 315, at 362-63 (emphasis added). The European Union directive on
database protection already has strong "sweat of the brow" protections. See id. at 362.
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facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.327
Of course, Feist is not limited to phone books. It applies to all factual
compilations, including databases,32 and potentially labels, such as the one at
issue in SmithKline.
If there is no copyright protection for the white pages, how can there be
any protection for product labels? Obviously, if everything on the label is
just a "fact" about the product, that information cannot be copyrighted.
Nutrition labeling and claims about foods and drugs would all be facts (and
in the case of drugs, they would have to be approved to be on the label in the
first instance). Such facts could not be the subject of a copyright. However,
the arrangement of words, pictures, and so forth on the label, is a protected
compilation that has some minimal degree of creativity.'29 Nonetheless,
there are only so many ways to put, for example, nutrition information on a
label. If everyone uses the same form (much as all white pages alphabetize),
then, under the so-called "merger doctrine," a label may still lack the
originality necessary to be copyrightable"3 In most cases, a label possesses
at least some creative component, allowing it (but not the included facts) to
fall within the constitutional bounds of copyright. Further, the case for
protection arises in part from the FDCA's broad definition of label, which
covers all printed or graphic material accompanying a product."' Thus, as in
327. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50.
328. See, e.g., John F. Hayden, Copyright Protection of Computer Databases After Feist, 5 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 215 (1991); Philip H. Miller, Life After Feist: Facts, the First Amendment, and the
Copyright Status of Automated Databases, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 507 (1991); Jane C. Ginsburg,
Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1865 (1990). See also MERGES, ET AL., supra note 315, at 361-63 (citing these articles and
discussing potential protections for "sweat of the brow" investments).
329. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. Cf Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1970) (holding an arrangement of text, art work, and association between art work and text in a
greeting card was both original and copyrightable, although the individual elements were not). See
also SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29 n.5
(2000) ("Here, although the labeling at issue is more creative than that in the 'familiar' commercial
labeling cases ... SmithKline's copyright claim is arguably weaker than even the typical
commercial labeling case, because the copyrighted text was submitted to obtain FDA approval and
consequent market exclusivity.").
330. "When there is only one or but a few ways of expressing an idea, then courts will find that
the idea behind the work merges with its expression and the work is not copryightable." MERGES,
ET AL., supra note 315, at 384. See also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1967) (applying the merger doctrine); cf. Baker v. Selden 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (developing the
division between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas).
331. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) & (m) (2000) ("The term 'labeling' means all labels and other
written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2)
SmithKline, "labeling" is not just the factual information on the outside of
the Nicorette box, but also includes the accompanying user guide and audio
tapes. "2 However, the recognition that "labels themselves have only a
limited creative component"33 suggests that even protected labels are not at
the heart of copyright protection, and thus receive less judicial protection
from infringement than "familiar copyrighted materials such as sound
recordings or books." '34 Thus, while not explicitly saying so, part of what
drove Chief Judge Winter's decision in SmithKline may have been an
unexpressed view that labeling, despite any creativity, is simply not worthy
of the full protection afforded more "familiar" copyrighted works.
2. Constitutional Limits on the Duration and Purpose of IP Rights
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently
considered the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998... in Eldred v. Reno.33 6 The D.C. Circuit addressed
"whether the First Amendment or the Copyright Clause of the Constitution
of the United States constrains the Congress from extending for a period of
years the duration of copyrights, both those already extant and those yet to
come," and held that neither does."7 While quickly dispensing with the First
Amendment argument on the ground that there is no First Amendment right
to make commercial use of the copyrights of others, " ' the court also had to
accompanying such article."); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948) (applying § 321(m) to
literature having a common origin as the drugs and used in the sale of the drugs). See generally
Hurt & MERRILL, supra note 129, at 43-51 ("Scope of 'Labeling"').
332. See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 26 (noting that the FDA's broad interpretation of 21 U.S.C. §
321 (k) & (m) encompasses the Nicorette user guide and audiotape). Accord 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2)
(2001) (including "[b]rochures, booklets .... sound recordings .... and similar pieces of printed,
audio, or visual matter descriptive of a drug" as "labeling").
333. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1988).
334. Id. Cf Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (applying
the "fair use" defense, 17 U.S.C. § 107, and noting that the second fair use factor, "the nature of the
copyrighted work" reflects the "law['s] general[] recogni[tion oin a greater need to disseminate
factual works than works of fiction or fantasy," thus providing greater protection for fiction than
fact-based work). Cf SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 29 n.5.
Although commercial labeling is clearly copyrightable ... it has been recognized that the
'danger lurking in copyright protection for labels is that the tail threatens to wag the dog-
-proprietors at times seize on copyright protection for the label in order to leverage their
thin copyright protection over the text ... on the label into a monopoly on the typically
uncopyrightable product to which it is attached.
Id. (quoting I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[G][2], at 2-138) (citations omitted)).
335. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) & (c), 304 (2000).
336. 239 F.3d 372, reh'g denied, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert granted No. 01-618, 70
U.S.L.W. 3292 (Feb. 25, 2002).
337. Id. at 373.
338. See id. at 375-76. The court noted that "[a]lthough there is some tension between the
Constitution's copyright clause and the first amendment, the familiar idea/expression dichotomy of
copyright law, under which ideas are free but their particular expression can be copyrighted, has
always been held to give adequate protection to free expression." Id. at 376 (quoting United Video,
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address the argument that the "limited Times" '339 provision of the Patent and
Copyright Clause had been exceeded.
The plaintiff argued that the preamble of the Copyright Clause ("The
Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.. "3.") provides a limiting principle to give meaning to "limited
Times." The idea is that the phrase "limited Times" should be read as
"reaching only as far as is justified by the preambular statement of purpose:
If 50 years are enough to 'promote... Progress,' then a grant of 70 years is
unconstitutional." '34 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and sustained
the twenty-year extension, in part based on its previous decision in
Schnapper v. Foley,34 where it "rejected the argument 'that the introductory
language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional
power.""'34  Further, the court suggested it would be a valid exercise of
Congress' power under the Patent and Copyright Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause to grant a term extension as "Congress found that
extending the duration of copyrights on existing works would, among other
things, give copyright holders an incentive to preserve older works,
particularly motion pictures in need of restoration" and thus the "application
of the CTEA to subsisting copyrights is 'plainly adapted' and 'appropriate'
to 'promot[ing] progress."'  Thus, Congress' power to confer additional
protection on copyrights, by extending their period of protected exclusivity,
was upheld.
There was a dissenting opinion in Eldred from Judge David Sentelle 45
Had this view prevailed (as it may yet, since the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari), there would be a substantive, constitutional limitation on
Congress' ability to extend the protection of patents and copyrights. Judge
Sentelle "concur[red] with much of the majority's opinion," but dissented
"insofar as it holds constitutional the twenty-year or more extension of
copyright protection for existing works." '346 The dissent observed that the
Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
339. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
340. Id.
341. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 377-78.
342. 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
343. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378 (quoting Schapper, 667 F.2d at 112).
344. Id. at 379.
345. Id. at 380 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge Sentelle, joined by Judge Tatel, also dissented
from the denial of rehearing en banc. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert granted No. 01-618, 70 U.S.L.W.
3292 (Feb, 25, 2002). The author was not clerking for Judge Sentelle at the time of the Eldred case
or the denial of rehearing. As throughout this Article, the views expressed herein are solely those of
the author.
346. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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court must "consider the scope of one of the clauses granting enumerated
powers to Congress, specifically, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8" and in "ascertaining the
breadth of an enumerated power," and urged following "the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez," including
"'start[ing] with first principles."'347 This approach requires recognition that
our federal government is one of enumerated and therefore limited powers,
and thus there must be outer limits to these enumerated powers."' The
dissent "fear[ed] that the rationale offered by the government for the
copyright extension, as accepted by the district court and the majority, leads
to such an unlimited view of the copyright power as the Supreme Court
rejected with reference to the Commerce Clause in Lopez.""34
Judge Sentelle suggested that the court should look to the language of
the Patent and Copyright Clause itself to discern a limiting principle, just as
the Supreme Court has done in its recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
That clause empowers the Congress to do one thing, and one thing
only. That one thing is "to promote the progress of science and
useful arts." How may Congress do that? "By securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." The clause is not an open grant of power
to secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to promote
progress. The means by which that power is to be exercised is
certainly the granting of exclusive rights-not an elastic and open-
ended use of that means, but only a securing for limited times.350
Clearly, Congress can not secure patent and copyright protection for
indefinite or infinite periods, "[h]owever, there is no apparent substantive
distinction between permanent protection and permanently available
authority to extend originally limited protection." '35 To limit this power to
extend originally limited protection, the dissent suggests that it cannot be
347. Id. at 380-81 (internal citation omitted).
348. See id. at 381 ("It would seem to me apparent that this concept of 'outer limits' to
enumerated powers applies not only to the Commerce Clause but to all the enumerated powers,
including the Copyright Clause, which we consider today.").
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.at382.
The Congress that can extend the protection of an existing work from 100 years to 120
years; can extend that protection from 120 years to 140; and from 140 to 200; and from
200 to 300; and in effect can accomplish precisely what the majority admits it cannot do
directly. This, in my view, exceeds the proper understanding of enumerated powers
reflected in the Lopez principle of requiring some definable stopping point.
Id. In the dissent from rehearing en banc, Judge Sentelle reiterated that "the Court's construction of
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution renders Congress' power under Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, limitless
despite express limitations in the terms of that clause." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 854 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert granted No. 01-618, 70
U.S.L.W. 3292 (Feb, 25, 2002).
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applied retroactively to preexisting copyrighted works, because such
retroactive extension does not promote the useful arts. 52 Thus, under the
dissent's view, "the extension of exclusivity previously secured" is not
within the scope of the Patent and Copyright Clause and is not
constitutional.3
If adopted (as it may yet be by the Supreme Court), Judge Sentelle's
view would obviously not affect all IP rights, but it would tie Congress'
hands in further protecting already existing intellectual property pursuant to
the Patent and Copyright Clause. The three previous extensions of copyright
protection that have occurred would be unconstitutional.354 Further, the
patent term extension for pre-existing patents on products that are subject to
regulation under the FDCA,"' could be unconstitutional. That provision is
designed to "restore" part of the period lost due to regulatory review by the
FDA. 56 Perhaps the restorative nature of the extension, and its relationship
to the purpose of promoting the progress of science would be enough of a
constraint to limit the scope of this enumerated power. In construing the
statutory provisions of the patent extension, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that "the term of the patent may be
given only one restoration extension."3 7 Even if the patentee has multiple
products under one patent that are delayed different periods of time by FDA
approval, the patentee can only receive one restoration period, which only
applies "to the product on which the extension was based," not all other
products covered by the patent.38 Nonetheless, Judge Sentelle's approach
calls the permissibility of even this limited, restorative extension into
question.
Ultimately Judge Sentelle may have the better argument, at least
regarding general, non-restorative extension. I suspect he does. After all,
what, other than the introductory language to the Patent and Copyright
Clause, would prohibit Congress from granting a one thousand year term?
This would be a "limited time," but cannot be said to have any rational
relation to promoting science and the useful arts. Similarly, what would
352. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382. To buttress his position, Judge Sentelle noted that "[t]he
government has offered no tenable theory as to how retrospective extension can promote the useful
arts." Id.
353. Id.
354. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831 § 1, 4 Stat. 436-39; Act of March 4, 1909 § 23, 35 Stat. 1075-88;
Pub. L. No.94-553 § 301,90 Stat. 2541-2602 (1976).
355. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, V CHISUM ON PATENTS §
16.04[5] (1997).
356. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
357. Id. at 1547 (emphasis in original).
358. Id. at 1547.
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preclude Congress from incrementally increasing the term of, e.g., copyright
protection to effectively provide infinite (or at least indefinite) protection?
Some suggest that this "copyright creep" has already occurred. Congress
extended terms throughout the 1960's, in 1976, and now again in 1998, just
in time to intercept "[plop icons such as Mickey Mouse, books such as The
Great Gatsby, films such as The Jazz Singer, [and] musicals such as Show
Boat, [all] poised to enter the public domain" and give their owners extended
exclusivity. 59 Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that Judge Sentelle's
approach would result in further judicial limitations on Congress' ability to
create and protect intellectual property rights. Thus, whether it be in the
name of administrative deference, as in SmithKline, or sovereign immunity,
as in Florida Prepaid, or the doctrine of limited and enumerated powers, as
Judge Sentelle urged in Eldred, these cases demonstrate a judicially-led
curtailing (or attempted curtailing) of congressionally enacted intellectual
property rights.
IV. TOWARDS A "TAKINGS" THEORY OF INFRINGEMENT:
PROVIDING "JUST COMPENSATION"
Parts I through III have examined governmental intrusions on and
infringement of intellectual property rights, without compensation, that were
sanctioned by administrative agencies, Congress, or the courts. Part IV
explores the applicability of a constitutional remedy that in many cases may
be available to the intellectual property owner, against both federal and state
entities. That remedy is the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
applicable to the states through Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.""36 There are three distinct elements to this provision: (1) a
taking of private property; (2) for public use;36' (3) with just compensation.
In most Takings Clause cases the issue is whether a taking has occurred in
the first instance, and in that context, usually the dispute is over the impact
of government regulations on a property owner.
359. Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Aug. 29, 1999, available at
http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-29/featurestory I .shtml.
360. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
361. The "public use" requirement is actually rather thin, a factor that will be important in the
intellectual property context. "The 'public use' requirement is ... coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers." Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). Thus,
"where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."
Id. at 241. In Hawaii Housing, the Court sustained a legislative scheme were "property taken
outright by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries" stating that it
"long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general
public" and that "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under
the Public Use Clause." Id. at 244. The fact that a government's eminent domain power is used to
the benefit of individuals, rather than the public at large, is no barrier, so long as there is an
overarching public purpose.
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The Rehnquist Court gave the Takings Clause life and breadth,
providing property owners remedies against government regulations that "go
too far." '62 Thus, it is a ripe opportunity for IP owners to seek broader
application of the Takings Clause to governmental actions that would
constitute infringement. A takings theory of infringement would treat
government infringement as a taking, requiring "just compensation."
Section A reviews the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, the doctrinal
bases for determining that a taking has occurred, and discusses an analytical
framework for approaching takings. Section B applies this jurisprudence to
intellectual property by first considering what IP constitutes "property" for
the purposes of the Takings Clause, and then examining how infringement
fits within the takings mold. The Court has given some guidance as to how
traditional forms of intellectual property may be taken. Further, Congress
has also created special remedies for some federal government infringement
that may be based on recognition of the Fifth Amendment's guarantees of
just compensation. These will also be explored in Section B. In Section C, I
apply the takings jurisprudence to the SmithKline case and consider whether
the facts in that case constitute a taking, and if not, what, if any, similar
circumstances would give rise to a taking. Finally, Section D considers
application of the Takings Clause to the states, and whether it, as applied
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides a path around Florida
Prepaid, Alden, and sovereign immunity generally into state, and perhaps
federal, court for state acts of infringement.
A. Takings Jurisprudence
Before considering how intellectual property rights should be analyzed
under the Takings Clause, it is important to examine the conceptual
framework under which the Supreme Court has treated takings of "real"
property. "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.""3 3
It is recognized that "Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law";3" however, this is subject to the "oft-cited
maxim that, 'while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
362. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
363. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
364. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.""6 Yet, in the years
of takings jurisprudence succeeding Justice Holmes's pronouncement of this
"general rule," '366 the Supreme Court has "generally eschewed any 'set
formula."'367  Rather, determinations of takings have been described as
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," "' depending "upon the particular
facts," '369 and requiring "complex factual assessments of the purposes and
economic effects of government actions."37 The Court has, nonetheless,
identified "two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable
without case-specific inquiry ... "37, These two per se categories of takings
are "physical invasion" of property and "regulation den[ying] all
economically beneficial or productive use of land." '372
Although the picture appears rather muddled,373 the Court's approach to
takings cases can be grouped into four categories, each approached
somewhat differently.7  These categories are (1) Physical Invasion of
Property; (2) Deprivation of a "Core" Property Right; (3) Linkage
Conditions - Unconstitutional Conditions; and (4) Regulatory Takings. As
we will see in Section B, the first category, "Physical Invasion of Property"
is of limited utility in the intellectual property context, unless a strong
analog to invasion can be identified. We will also see that the second
category, while potentially quite relevant if applied to the "right to exclude,"
is effectively limited following cases such as PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins.7 Nonetheless, this four-pronged analytical framework is useful in
distinguishing when government action is per se a taking, and when a
365. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 415).
366. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
367. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
368. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
369. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
370. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992). See also City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999) (collecting cases).
371. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
372. Id.
373. Muddled may be an understatement. The Court's general preference for balancing (weighing
factors such as "reasonableness") but having some "per se" exceptions carved out is reminiscent of
its treatment of antitrust claims under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. See, e.g., State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("[Mlost antitrust claims are analyzed under a 'rule of
reason,' according to which the finder of fact must... tak[e] into account a variety of factors ....
Some types of restraints, however ... are deemed unlawful per se."). The Court's antitrust analysis
has never been accused of being at the pinnacle of clarity. Analyzing which restraints fall into the
per se category and weighing the factors under the "rule of reason" is a in an indeterminate and
confused exercise at best. See generally, Terry Calvani, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule:
Some Thoughts on the Rule of Reason, SE47 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 25 (2000).
374. Much of this categorization is derived from JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES § 12.2, at 1252-62, 1282-86 (2d ed. 1997). Professor Singer
described this four-category analytical approach in his lectures on Property Law at Harvard Law
School in December, 1998.
375. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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balancing test is appropriate - and what factors should be balanced. The
framework also provides a starting point for analyzing takings of intellectual
property.
1. Physical Invasion of Property
"[P]hysical intrusion by government" has "long [been] considered" a
"property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the
Takings Clause.""3 6 Thus, "[w]hen faced with a constitutional challenge to a
permanent physical occupation of real property [the] Court has invariably
found a taking."3" In reaching this conclusion, the reasonableness of the
property invasion does not matter, nor does the extent of impact on the
property owner. Rather, as the Loretto Court observed, where the
"'character of the governmental action' [] is a permanent physical occupation
of property, [the Court's] cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent
of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner. ' 3 8  Thus, Loretto and Lucas both recognize permanent physical
invasions as per se takings. As the Lucas Court observed: "In general ... no
matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public
purpose behind it, we have required compensation."''
This per se approach is explained by the Court's conceptualization of
property rights, which may be instructive in seeking an IP analog to physical
invasion. Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the
rights to "possess, use and dispose of it."3 ' Thus, by permanently physically
occupying property, the government "effectively destroys each of these
rights."38 ' The owner is precluded from possessing the occupied space and
has no power to exclude the occupier. "The power to exclude has
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's
376. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
377. Id. at 427. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1872)
(holding that a government authorized flooding of plaintiff's property constituted a taking); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946) (observing physical invasions of airspace to be a taking);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) ("[T]he imposition of the navigational
servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina ....
And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless
pay just compensation.").
378. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)) (internal citation omitted).
379. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
380. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378
(1945)).
381. Id.
bundle of property rights."3"2 The owner is also denied power to control the
use of her property, and is effectively precluded from transferring the
occupied space, as "the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger
will ordinarily empty the right of any value . .. ,383 The Loretto Court
considered the permanence of the occupation to be highly significant,
"distinguish[ing] it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude, 3.4
because these temporary limitations "do not absolutely dispossess the owner
of his rights to use, and exclude others from, his property." '385
2. Deprivation of a "Core" Property Right
In many respects, this category is a broader generalization of the first;
however, permanent physical invasion by the government does not "simply
take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through
the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.""3 6 By a "core" property right, I
envision a single strand in the bundle, the removal of which is enough to
constitute a taking. The only such right recognized to date was found in
Hodel v. Irving,"7 where the Court held that completely abolishing the right
to pass on fee simple property at death is a per se taking." In contrast, the
Court has allowed a complete prohibition on the sale of personal property in
Andrus v. Allard.8 ' If Allard is to be distinguished, it must be that there was
not prohibition on alienation, ° but just on "one means of disposing" of
them. 9' There the Court observed, "[T]he denial of one traditional property
right does not always amount to a taking. 392 Assuming Allard remains good
law after Hodel,393 there is no guide as to what sticks in the bundle of
382. Id.
383. id. at 436.
384. id. at 435 n.12 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 435.
387. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
388. Id. at 716-17.
[T]he regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain
type of property ... to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on property-
-to one's family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since
feudal times.... [A] total abrogation of these rights cannot be upheld.
Id.
389. 444 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1979) (holding that a complete prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers
did not constitute a taking).
390. The Court also noted that the challenged regulations "do not compel the surrender of the
artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restrain upon them." Allard, 444 U.S. at 65.
391. Id.
392. id.
393. But see Hodel, 481 U.S. at 719 (Scalia J., concurring) (noting that "the present statute,
insofar as concerns the balance between rights taken and rights left untouched, is indistinguishable
from the statute that was at issue in Andrus v. Allard .... Because that comparison is determinative
of whether there has been a taking, in finding a taking today our decision effectively limits Allard to
its facts").
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property rights are "core," for even tradition is apparently not dispositive.
One might think that the right to exclude, being "one of the most
treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights, 394 would be a
"core" right. Were this so, it would have definite implications for
intellectual property rights. However, as noted above, some limitations on
the right to exclude are permissible. In PruneYard and in Yee v. City of
Escondido, the Court found that significant limitations on the right to
exclude were not takings. In PruneYard, the plaintiff sought to exclude the
circulation of petitions in his shopping center, and was prohibited from
doing so by the California Supreme Court's construction of its state
constitution.395 Rejecting the takings claim, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property
rights is the right to exclude others," and that there had "literally been a
'taking' of that right,"'396 but the Court concluded that "not every destruction
or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking'
in the constitutional sense."'3 97 Thus, the Court concluded that even after the
California Supreme Court decision, "PruneYard may restrict expressive
activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations." '398 The Court
emphasized that the shopping center "is open to the public,"'3 and that under
"these circumstances, the fact that they may have 'physically invaded'
appellants' property cannot be viewed as determinative."" Similarly, in
distinguishing PruneYard, Justice Marshall thought it significant that the
case only presented temporary limitations, rather than an absolute loss of the
right to exclude others."0 ' So perhaps a total loss of the right to exclude,
even if there was no permanent physical invasion, would be the taking of a
"core" property right, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
In Yee v. City of Escondido, 2 the Supreme Court rejected a takings
claim where mobile home lot owners were restricted from "set[ting] rents or
decid[ing] who their tenants will be."4"3  The plaintiffs argued that
ordinances amounted to compelled physical occupation, however the Court
denied this, saying "[b]ecause they voluntarily open their property to
occupation by others, petitioners cannot assert a per se right to compensation
394. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
395. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
396. Id. at 82.
397. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
398. Id. at 83.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 84.
401. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982).
402. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
403. Id. at 526.
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based on their inability to exclude particular individuals."4" The Court
concluded that the land owners had not lost the "right to exclude," because
they could change the use of their land from a mobile home lot, and evict the
tenants, as long as they gave six to twelve months notice.' °0 Although the
restriction on the right to exclude was significant, and was only a "regulation
of petitioners' use of their property, and thus does not amount to a per se
taking."' Apparently restrictions on the right to exclude do not violate a
"core" property right, though, again, a total deprivation of the right to
exclude might.
3. Linkage Conditions - Unconstitutional Conditions
The Takings Clause bars the government "from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.""4 7 Certain kinds of regulations impose
requirements on property owners that they effectively deed some of their
property rights for public use in exchange for the right to use their property
in certain ways. Thus, there is a "linkage" or "extraction," where the
property owner must, for example, allow an easement, or pay fees in
exchange for permission to build. In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, ' the Supreme Court held that "governmental authority to
exact such a condition was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." ' 9 As noted in Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is
taken for public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or
no relationship to the property.4
Thus, if there is no "essential nexus" between the "legitimate state
interest" and the condition exacted by the city on the owner's property, then
there is a taking.4 ' Further, even if such a nexus exists, there must be a
"rough proportionality" between the required condition and the effect of the
404. Id. at 531.
405. See id. at 528 (citing Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 798.56(g)).
406. Id. at 532.
407. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
408. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
409. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
410. Id.
411. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
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use allowed by the government.' 2 Such a "rough proportionality" does not
require "precise mathematical calculation," but at least "some sort of
individualized determination."" 3
4. Regulatory Takings
In many ways, this final category is a catchall, which could be used to
umbrella the proceeding categories. However, it is intended to address
government regulations on the use of property. Generally, regulatory
takings are analyzed under the three-factor test introduced in Penn Central.
These factors are: (a) the character of the government action; (b) diminution
in value of the property; and (c) the extent of interference with reasonable,
investment-backed expectations."' These factors provide guidance, but must
be viewed in light of the overall circumstances. As Justice Sutherland
observed seventy-five years ago, "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and
validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they
are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive."4" However,
where "the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives [property] of all
economically beneficial use" it may only do so where the proscribed use
interests were not part of the property right to begin with (i.e. one may be
proscribed from creating a nuisance). " '6 Therefore, regulations that prohibit
all economically beneficial or viable use of property are per se takings of
that property. 47  Although the exact contours of what it means to deprive
property of all economically beneficial use are unclear,4 8 such a deprivation
412. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. Dolan actually requires "rough proportionality" between the
required condition and the "impact of the proposed development." Id. Obviously, not all property
rights involve building and development. The "impact" is really a way of measuring the effect of the
use that is allowed. One might say that the impact is the effect of the benefit conferred by the
government. However, in Nollan, Justice Scalia objected to the suggestion that exercise of an
established property right (albeit one that had been previously restricted) was merely a "valuable
Government benefit." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2. In dissent, Justice Brennan rejected this
distinction. See id. at 860 n.10.
413. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
414. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); SINGER, supra note 374, at 1253.
415. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
416. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
417. See id. at 1029.
418. Indeed, in Lucas, the Court had the unusual circumstance where the state trial court "found a
prohibition rendered Lucas's property 'valueless."' See id. at 1007; id. at 1076 (Statement of Souter,
J.) (suggesting dismissal of certiorari improvidently granted, as "the state trial court's conclusion is
highly questionable"). The Supreme Court recently addressed the question "whether the remaining
permissible uses of regulated property are economically viable merely because the property retains a
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does present a rare case. Most regulatory takings are considered under the
three Penn Central factors.
a. Character of Government Action
"The 'character of the government action' concerns the issue of whether
the regulation is more closely analogous to a physical invasion or seizure of
a core property right" or rather "to a general regulatory program affecting
numerous parcels and designed to protect the public from harm by adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."49
Regulations are less likely to be considered creating a taking if they are
perceived as "part of the burden of common citizenship."420  Thus,
limitations on property use to protect the community from harm, or that
respond to externalities, rather than extractions of benefits, are less likely to
be considered takings.42' Similarly, regulations that achieve an "average
reciprocity of advantage, meaning that those whose property interests are
adversely affected by the regulation also benefit from it by the concomitant
regulation of other people's property rights" are less likely to be held to be
takings.422 Finally, a choice between incompatible property interests is also
not generally regarded as a taking.423 In contrast, a forced physical invasion,
albeit temporary, the extraction of a benefit for the good of the community,424
or a forced "redistribution of bargained-for contractual rights" rather than a
"general regulatory program, ,421 is more likely to be held a taking. Thus,
where the government seeks to achieve goals through regulation, which it is
empowered to do through the "use of eminent domain," it suggests the
"practical equivalence" of "negative regulation and appropriation," and
hence a taking.426
value greater than zero" in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, (2001).
419. SINGER, supra note 374, at 1258. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
420. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
421. See SINGER, supra note 374, at 1258.
422. Id. (emphasis in original). See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(distinguishing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914), as it involved "a
requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of
advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws"); cf. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
133-35.
423. See SINGER, supra note 374, at 1259; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding
state statute requiring owners to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees because they
produced cedar rust fatal to apple trees cultivated nearby, even where there was no compensation for
the value of the standing trees or loss in property value); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 126 ("The
[Miller v. Schoene] Court held that the State might properly make 'a choice between the preservation
of one class of property and that of the other .... ').
424. The benefit/harm distinction, though perhaps "intuitive," is often a difficult one, and has been
criticized. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he distinction
between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.");
see also SINGER, supra note 374, at 1255-56.
425. SINGER, supra note 374, at 1258.
426. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
[Vol. 29: 435, 2002 Protecting Private Intellectual Property
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
b. Diminution in Value of Property
Some diminution in value of property by regulations is certainly
permissible because government "hardly could go on" if it had to pay "for
every such change in the general law." '427 At a minimum, a property owner is
not always entitled to the highest and "most beneficial" use of her
property.428 Even "significantly diminish[ing] the value" of a property may
not give rise to a taking.42  Thus, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty,430 which upheld
the validity of zoning ordinances, the Court found that a zoning requirement
resulting in a loss in market value of seventy-five percent was not a taking,
and did not require compensation. Obviously, as it approaches a "total
taking," i.e. one hundred percent loss in value, then it becomes more like a
taking.43 Where that line is to be drawn is unclear. '32 The regulation is more
likely to be considered a taking if it destroys or removes a large portion of
the market value of the property or if it leaves little economically viable use.
A taking could occur if something of independent value was taken from the
property, even if the remaining property had significant value.433 The takings
analysis would focus on the removed property. A diminution in value is less
likely to be a taking if what is lost was of little or no value, and what is left
allows the owner a reasonable return on his investment, even if the value of
the investment is greatly diminished.43 Even a more substantial diminution
is justified (perhaps even a 100% loss) if there is a "sufficiently strong
427. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
428. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125; see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
429. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
430. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394 (holding 872% diminution in value
was not a taking).
431. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
432. Lower courts have struggled with this issue. See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing partial takings); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing de minimis value). Leaving only a de minimis value is
not sufficient. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 45 (1994) (Loren Smith, C.J.)
("[N]othing in the language of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to find a taking only when the
Government divests the total ownership of the property," the court reasoned. "[U]nder the guise of
regulation [the] government cannot take from a property owner the core value of the property,
leaving the owner with only a hollow deed."). The Supreme Court recently wrestled with this very
issue of line drawing in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) without reaching any
meaningful resolution.
433. Cf Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1977) (involving breach of
contract) ("Cutting a few trees on a timber tract, or taking a few hundred tons of coal from a mine,
might not diminish the market value of the tract, or of the mine, and yet the value of the wood or
coal, severed from the soil, might be considerable.").
434. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 408-09.
public interest; for example ... to prevent a 'noxious use' and thereby to
protect the public from harm." '435
c. Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
A regulation is more likely to be held a taking if a citizen has
already invested substantially in reasonable reliance on an existing
statutory or regulatory scheme; it is less likely to be ruled a taking if
the regulation prevents the owner from realizing an expected benefit
in the future.436
Some economic harms are to interests that are not "sufficiently bound up
with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for
Fifth Amendment purposes." '437 In other cases, the property may well fall
within the Fifth Amendment's scope, but it is unreasonable for the property
owner to believe they will be able to use their property in the desired way.
Thus, zoning regulations restrict the manner in which property may be used,
but such regulations are expected. "If, however, a developer spends
substantial amounts of money on architectural and construction work for a
particular project in reliance on existing zoning regulations and issuance of a
building permit, courts are likely to hold retroactive application of changes
in the zoning law invalid.""43 Thus, a regulation is more likely to be held a
taking if it interferes with an existing use of the property or with vested
rights. In contrast, however, a regulation is less likely a taking if it merely
imposes an opportunity loss, or if the property owner's reliance on the
continuation of prior law was unreasonable. " In a heavily regulated field
(such as pharmaceuticals), the standard for finding reasonableness in
investment-backed expectations is higher than in largely deregulated
activities.
With this four-part analytical framework in mind, we may now consider
how government infringement of intellectual property gives rise to a taking.
B. Takings of Intellectual Property
The analytical framework described above can be applied to takings of
intellectual property; however, as a preliminary matter, we must consider to
what extent IP is "property" for Fifth Amendment takings purposes. Then
we may consider when or how it may be "taken" through infringement or
435. SINGER, supra note 374, at 1259; see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-25.
436. SINGER, supra note 374, at 1259.
437. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (collecting cases).
438. SINGER, supra note 374, at 1260 (citing Stone v. City of Wilton, 331 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa
1983)).
439. Id.
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other restrictions.
1. Is Intellectual Property Fifth Amendment "Property"?
The short (if not obvious) answer to the question "is intellectual
property 'property' within the scope of the Fifth Amendment?" is "it
depends": it depends on the kinds of IP rights involved. In some cases the
answer is an easy yes, others an easy no, and predictably, there may be
forms of IP, both well-known and emergent, for which it is hard to answer
this question. To some extent it may be nonsense to simply ask in the
abstract, "is this property that can be taken" without examining the context
of the alleged taking. Thus, the "property-ness" of the IP right may well
depend on what is being done with it. Several scholars have begun to
address this issue, and their insight provides a useful place to begin. " '
Perhaps the most common property right in IP is the "right to exclude,"
which is certainly present in patent, copyright, and trademark law. But is
that enough? In some intellectual property (for example, patents), there is
no right other than the right to exclude. The late Judge Rich of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit proposed the following
"pedagogical tool":
Postulate that there is not now and never was a patent system. A
person makes an invention. Assuming there is no law prohibiting it,
can he make it? Can he use it? Can he sell it? Yes. Without a
patent, he has all these rights. Now let's write down... what the
[patent] statute says the patent grants the inventor:
A. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO MAKE, USE, AND SELL
and write under it what rights he had without a patent:
B. THE RIGHT TO MAKE, USE, AND SELL
Now, let's subtract B from A and see what the patent gave him
440. E.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth
Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529 (1998); John T. Cross, Intellectual Property and the Eleventh
Amendment After Seminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 519 (1998); Paul J. Heald & Michael L.
Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal
Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity
Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (1998).
EXCLUSIVE
Every business man knows what it means to "have the exclusive"
on something. What he gets from the patent-and all he gets-is a
right to exclude. That's the patent right. 4'
As noted by Professor Chisum, the "right to exclude, without the right to
use, is somewhat peculiar to patent law (as well as the law of copyright and
negative easements).""44 Congress has specified, "[P]atents shall have the
attributes of personal property." '' However, Congress' "saying so" does not
make it so when it comes to defining constitutional provisions. As we were
forcefully reminded last Term, "Congress may not legislatively supersede
[the Supreme Court's] decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution.""44 Thus, it is the Supreme Court's definition of property under
the Fifth Amendment that matters.'
As noted by Professors Heald and Wells, the Supreme Court "has
defined 'property' very broadly in the Fifth Amendment context.
'
0
46
Property "denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the [thing owned], as the right to possess, use and dispose of it .... The
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may
441, DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 5 (1998) (quoting Columbia lecture
notes of Judge Rich).
442. Id. The exclusionary right "is in a sense a negative right." MERGES, ET. AL., supra note 315,
at 134. A patent "does not automatically grant an affirmative right to do anything; patented
pharmaceuticals, for instance, must still pass regulatory review at the Food and Drug Administration
to be sold legally." Id. Further, a patented invention "may itself be covered by a preexisting patent."
Id.
443. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
444. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
445. Despite the Court's recent claims of exclusivity in defining constitutional provisions, e.g.
Dickerson, College Savings, and City of Boerne, it is unclear that it is actually so here, though
College Savings seems squarely on point. As recently as the Lucas decision, Justice Scalia reminded
us that the Court's taking jurisprudence "has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire
when they obtain title to property." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)
(emphasis added). In other words, the Court looks to state law in determining a property right. Put
differently, state law (albeit in the form background, common-law rules) defines the scope of some
property interests, and thus the scope of the Takings Clause. That a state cannot substantially change
these laws without providing compensation for eliminating a property right does not make it any less
the state's law that is doing the heavy lifting here. Justice Stewart puts it more squarely that
"[p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem form an independent source
such as state law." Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), quoted in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003). If "understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law" determine what is "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause, then why is Congress
any less equipped to be such an independent source? Given that patents and copyrights, as well as
other forms of property, are federally defined, should not Congress' definition automatically carry
the day?
446. Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 855.
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possess." '447 Further, the Court has recognized that the "hallmark of a
protected property interest is the right to exclude others. That is 'one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property.""'4 8  In other words, the "overriding theme is exclusivity." '9
Given this recognition, intellectual "property" that includes the right to
exclude should qualify as "property," while that which does not include the
right is more suspect. It is no surprise that courts have repeatedly treated
patents as property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."'
What then of copyright? Copyrights are described as granting certain
exclusive rights, such as the right to reproduce, distribute, sell, perform, or
display the copyrighted work.45' However, a wrinkle is that unlike patent
law, copyright does not give a "truly exclusive right to the work."4 2 Rather,
the copyright holder "can only prevent others from copying or distributing
the original work" or copies of the original. 3 As Professor Cross observes,
independent creation of an identical work, though unlikely, is not itself
447. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
448. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
449. Cross, supra note 440, at 545. Professor Cross goes on to suggest a "rough definition of
property for purposes of the takings restriction" as "an identifiable thing in which a person has a
legally-protected expectation of exclusive possession and use." Id. He claims patents, copyrights,
and trademarks meet this definition. However, his "rough definition" is potentially too broad. There
is no right to exclusive possession and use, as, in the case with patents, the owner may not be able to
use his invention. Only to the extent that his invention can legally be used does he have exclusive
rights to use. See supra notes 441-42 and accompanying text. Moreover, there may be "blocking
patents" that prevent the patentee from using his invention, even if use is legal. See supra note 442.
450. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) ("That a patent is
property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and by government, has been long
settled."). In James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881), the Court reasoned,
That the Government of the United States when it grants letters-patent for a new
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation
land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no doubt.
Id. at 357-58; see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain."). Similarly, courts have recognized that patents are "property" in the general sense and
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) ("Patents ... have long been considered a species
of property .... As such, they are surely included within the 'property' of which no person may be
deprived by a State without due process of law."); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of
'property."').
451. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) ("Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works").
452. Cross, supra note 440, at 546.
453. Id. (emphasis added).
actionable.454 Put more eloquently, "if by some magic a man who had never
known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be
an 'author,"' entitled to copyright protection of his own, and not infringing
any copyright Keats might have. 5 ' Yet, this loophole in exclusivity does not
defeat copyright's treatment as property. The copyright does protect one's
own work, and gives an exclusive right to copy, distribute, etc., the "fruits of
one's own intellectual labors.""4 6 As the Second Circuit has observed, albeit
in dicta, "[a]n interest in a copyright is a property right protected by the due
process and just compensation clauses of the Constitution." '457 This view is
reinforced given that the Supreme Court has recognized as property, for the
purposes of the Just Compensation Clause, more ephemeral IP rights.5 8 It is
also reinforced by Title 28, section 1498 of the United States Code, which
creates a cause of action against the United States for federal government
infringement of the copyright. 9 The Federal Circuit, which reviews appeals
from the Court of Federal Claims, has suggested that section 1498, informed
by the Takings Clause, is an expression of "the government... exercising
its power of eminent domain."46
Trademark law also presents its own unique issues in defining the scope
of "property." The Lanham Act and state trademark laws give rise to
generally exclusive rights to a mark, but again not entirely.46 The owner of
a trademark cannot stop just anyone from using the same mark; instead, the
law "only forbids others from using the mark when that use would result in
customer confusion., 46' Thus, often the same mark can be used, but in
different geographic regions. 6 ' Even so, there is a significant scope of
454. See id. at 546-47.
455. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.). Of
course, any copyright that may have ever existed on Keats's Ode would have long since expired, but
the point is nonetheless clear.
456. Cross, supra note 440, at 547.
457. Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871
F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that copyright "taken for public use" gives rise to "a
constitutional right to just compensation").
458. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984) (holding that a "trade-secret
property right" is "protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment"). Trade secrets and
other more ephemeral IP rights will be discussed below.
459. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b). Section 1498 gives the patent or copyright owner an exclusive remedy
in the United States Court of Federal Claims, rather than in a federal district court. See id. at (a) &
(b). Section 1498 gives the patent or copyright owner less extensive remedies than normally
available for infringement. "Reasonable and entire compensation" is available, but injunctions are
not. See id.
460. CHISUM, ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1023 (1998) (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc.
v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)).
461. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000).
462. Cross, supra note 440, at 546.
463. The Lanham Act gives nationwide rights to owners who register their marks with the Patent
and Trademark Office. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2000). However, as Professor Cross notes, many
courts will not allow a trademark owner who does not do business in a given area to recover against
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exclusivity carved out for the trademark holder. Despite this exclusivity,
"trademark rights exist only in connection with the goodwill associated with
the owner's business operation.""' The upshot is that the deprivation of a
trademark alone may not be a deprivation of property. As the trademark is
"'merely a protection for the good will' . . . only if a regulation takes the
owner's goodwill as well would there be a taking." 65 Here the nature of the
property interest is best informed by the nature of the taking. For example,
if the FDA merely prohibits the use of a trademark, it has not taken the
underlying goodwill, and perhaps not taken anything.466 However, if the
FDA also begins using the mark, or authorizing others to use the mark, then
it has taken the exclusivity away, and thus harms the underlying goodwill. 7
Once again the property interest is a "negative" one in exclusivity, not in
use, ' and should fall within the scope of the Takings Clause as such. Thus,
it is unsurprising that in College Savings, the Court observed: "The Lanham
Act may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable
property interests-notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of
trademarks, which are the 'property' of the owner because he can exclude
others from using them.
4 69
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 4 70 the court recognized that "a trade-
secret property right" under state law "is protected by the Taking Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 47 ' Trade secrets are "one of the weakest forms of
intellectual property," leading one commentator to observe that if trade
secrets are protected, "then patents, copyrights, and trademarks must
a competitor using the mark only in that given area. See Cross, supra note 440, at 546 n. 155 (citing
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959)).
464. Cross, supra note 440, at 545 n.152 (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right appurtenant
to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed."); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) ("The redress that is accorded in trade-mark cases
is based upon the party's right to be protected in the good-will of a trade or business.")).
465. Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1042 (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co.
v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916)) (emphasis added).
466. See id.; cf U.S. v. 7O2 Dozen Bottles "666," supra note 163, at 91.
467. See Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1042 ("This regulation will not
allow one manufacturer to use another's trademark or trade name .... Here, the government is not
taking any trademark or trade name for its own use ... .
468. See supra note 442.
469. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
(dicta) (citing Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1988) ("Trademark law, like
contract law, confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the
trademark owner a bundle of such rights.")).
470. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
471. Id. at 1003-04.
logically be protected as well." '72 Patent, copyright, and trademark rights at
least are "far more stable, certain, and property-like than trade secret law." '73
A trade secret does not give a broad right to exclusivity, as another
competitor may use the "secret" if she discovers it through non-surreptitious
means. 74 However, there remains, as in copyright, a limited right to certain
exclusive fruits of one's own intellectual labors.475 Trade secrets also "have
many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property" as they are
assignable, can form the res of a trust, and pass on to the trustee in
bankruptcy.476 The "property-ness" of trade secrets is related to the notion
that they are transferable rights. It is worth noting that Congress also
recognizes the "proprietary" interest companies have in their trade secrets.477
Other forms of intellectual property are even more challenging to
consider. Doctrinally related to trade secrets are rights of publicity, another
form of intellectual property rights.7 Such rights are both exclusive and
transferable - thus prime candidates for Fifth Amendment protection. Yet,
in College Savings, the Court held that right to be free of false advertising
could not be considered a species of "property." ' It's not entirely clear
why. The court suggests that there is no right to exclude associated with
"false advertising." Yet, a prohibition on false advertising can be thought of
472. Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 856. Professors Heald and Wells contend that to
"understand the breadth with which Ruckelshaus defines property, one must understand what a weak
form of property a trade secret is." Id. at 858. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (1995), defines trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation
of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others." There is only protection for such information if the
acquisition by a another comes from discovering it through breach of contract or a trespass. There is
no right to prevent someone from discovering the trade secret through, e.g. reverse engineering,
independent creation, or the trade secret owner's own carelessness. See, e.g., Schulenburg v.
Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865 (I11. 1965). Professor Tribe also suggests that Ruckelshaus should be
read broadly. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2, at 590-91 & n.I I
(2d ed. 1988).
473. Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 861.
474. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 40, 43 (1995) ("'Improper' means
of acquiring another's trade secret under the rule stated in § 40 include theft, fraud, unauthorized
interception of communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of
confidence .... Independent discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information
are not improper means of acquisition.").
475. See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
476. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
477. See id. (describing Congress' treatment of trade secrets in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act); see also Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000))
(providing protection for a wide range of information such as trade secrets). The Economic
Espionage Act turns the misappropriation of trade secrets into a federal criminal offense. Id.
478. See Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 862-63 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46); see also
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of
Laws: Tribal Court Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1996) (noting that
rights of publicity are analogous to intellectual property rights).
479. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999).
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as the right to exclude anyone from speaking falsely about your product.48 °
Certainly such a right is amorphous, and it is hard to see how it would be
independently transferable. If Congress wanted to create such a property
right, it is not entirely clear why it cannot, other than its harder to analogize
to traditional property interests.48'
In sum, though there are forms of intellectual property which may fall
beyond the scope of "property" as expressed in the Takings Clause, they are
the most abstract and amorphous of IP rights. Most forms of intellectual
property, or at least those for which there is commercial interest and a
market (patents, copyrights, trademarks, and even trade secrets), fall within
the scope of Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause as "property." When or
how they may be "taken" through infringement or other restrictions is the
next topic.
2. When Intellectual Property is "Taken"
Not all restrictions on property amount to takings, and that is
particularly true in the world of intellectual property, where the "property
right" does not always include the right to "occupy" or "use" the property,
but may only be the right to exclude. Nonetheless, the four-prong analytical
framework detailed in Part IV.A provides a systematic approach to
analyzing when government treatment of intellectual property rises to the
level of a taking.
a. "Physical" Invasions and "Core" Property Rights
At the outset the first category, "Physical Invasion of Property" seems
inapplicable, after all, "intellectual property is intangible, it cannot, strictly
speaking, be 'possessed."'482 Yet, physical invasion is really just a specific
form of confiscation. After all, "physical invasion" does not accurately
describe a taking of chattel - the government does not so much "invade" the
property as it confiscates it. If we recast the first category as "confiscation,"
then it becomes more readily applicable to intangible property such as IP.
Confiscation is where the government itself appropriates the IP owner's
intellectual property for its own use. For example, "when a state official
makes unauthorized copies of computer software rather than buying it or
uses patented biotechnology without obtaining permission" it is directly
480. See supra Part HI.B.
481. See id.; see also supra note 445.
482. Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 866.
infringing in a confiscatory way.483 James v. Campbell4' supports this view.
In the Court's assessment, the government could no more appropriate a
patented invention "without just compensation, any more than it can
appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a
private purchaser .... ."' It does not matter that the patent or other IP right
still has useful value to the IP owner, just as it did not matter that the
building owner in Loretto still had the vast bulk of his building to possess.
Direct use (i.e., direct infringement) by the government should be a per se
taking, just as much as confiscatory intrusion. The federal government is
apparently aware of its obligation, and thus, section 1498 requires
"reasonable and entire compensation" if the infringement is of a patent or
copyright.
486
Direct infringement presents a simple case of "eminent domain"
taking.487  The confiscatory/regulatory line begins to blur when the
488government uses IP but for a regulatory purpose. In Ruckelshaus,"8 9 there
is no question that the EPA can "use" trade secrets for the purpose of
evaluating the manufacturer's product for approval - that would be akin to a
license from the manufacturer. However, the Court also makes clear that it
was permissible for Congress to require disclosure of "all health, safety, and
environmental data" for use by the EPA. 9 ' If a distinction is to be drawn, it
must be between competitive government use as confiscatory, and
regulatory use - the latter being evaluated as a regulatory taking.
The "Core Property Right" approach also has great appeal for the
intellectual property setting. As IP rights are in some ways more restricted
than rights associated with "real property," the removal of a stick from the
bundle may cut deeper into the quick. Presumably the right to devise an IP
right would be "core" as in Hodel, but it might not be, as many IP rights are
for limited duration (e.g., patents and copyrights). What is central to all of
the IP rights explored in Part IV, is the right to exclude. In many cases, as
Judge Rich's "formula" illustrates,491 the only right associated with the
intellectual asset is the right to exclude. Certainly any total deprivation of
the "right to exclude" is a removal of not just a "core" property right, but of
483. Id. at 867.
484. 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
485. Id. at 358.
486. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a) & (b) (2000).
487. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (1996), vacated, 520 U.S. 1183
(1997) ("The government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain .... ").
488. See Cotter, supra note 440, at 554-55.
489. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
490. See id. at 995-96.; see also 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (2000) (detailing disclosure requirements).
491. See supra text accompanying note 441.
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the very essence of the intellectual property right.' More limited
restrictions on the right to exclude are less clear. The whole "fair use"
doctrine in copyright is about exceptions to the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder. '93 Similarly, in patent law, there are equitable restrictions
on the exclusive rights of patentees, and times where mandatory licenses
may be the required remedy. 94 Most obviously, section 1498 only allows
damages and fees, ' 95 not injunctions, for federal government infringements of
patents or copyrights. Limited restrictions on the right to exclude will have
to be examined either under a linkage or regulatory takings analysis,
depending on the circumstances. Nonetheless, a total deprivation of the
right to exclude (however limited that right may be defined) should be a per
se taking.
b. Linkage Conditions
Many restrictions on intellectual property come in the form of "Linkage
Conditions." The government will grant the right to use the IP in a
particular way, in exchange for an extraction or condition. The line between
linkages and general regulations can become blurred. For example, one
could say that the FDA will allow one to market one's patented drug in
exchange for going through the approval process, but that proves too much,
and in any event involves giving up nothing inherent in the patent right. The
better approach to linkages, rather than general regulatory programs is to
focus on quid pro quo involving the rights associated with the IP asset,
particularly the right to exclude. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. is directly on
point. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ["FIFRA"]
requires all pesticide manufacturers to register their products with the
EPA." In registering the product, manufacturers were required to submit
492. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1349-
50 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("lA]t bottom, a patent is but the right to exclude others .... "), rev'd on
sovereign immunity grounds, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of 'property."').
493. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
494. The "implied license" doctrine in patent law is simply a waiver of the patentee's right to
exclude. Such licenses "arise by acquiescence, by conduct, by equitable estoppel (estoppel in pais),
or by legal estoppel." Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
There is no requirement of "a formal finding of equitable estoppel as a prerequisite to a legal
conclusion of implied license." See id. at 1581.
495. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
judgment vacated, 520 U.S. 1183 (1997), aff'd, 140 F.3d 1470 (1998) ("Generally, the preferred
manner of reasonably and entirely compensating the patent owner is to require the government to
pay a reasonable royalty for its license as well as damages for its delay in paying the royalty.").
496. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991-92 (1984).
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data relating to the efficacy and safety of the products, as well as the
chemical formulas of the pesticides. '97 In turn, following EPA verification
and approval, the manufacturer is allowed to market the product. Thus far
there is clearly no taking, just a regulation of use. The 1972 Amendments to
FIFRA "included a provision that allowed EPA to consider data submitted
by one applicant for registration in support of another application pertaining
to a similar chemical." 9 ' In return, the subsequent applicant must offer to
compensate the original data provider, thus in effect "institut[ing] a
mandatory data-license scheme." '99  However, the 1972 Amendments
provided that "trade secrets or commercial or financial information" were
exempted from disclosure and "could not be considered at all by EPA to
support another registration application unless the original submitter
consented."'0 Thus, the property-like intellectual assets of the manufacturer
were protected. Following litigation resulting in broad application of the
trade secret exemption to a great field of "health, safety, and environmental
data," preventing EPA from disclosing a majority of the data it had relied
upon, FIFRA was again amended in 1978.' 0' The 1978 Amendments
provided a ten-year exclusivity period for data relating to pesticides
registered after September 30, 1978.02 It permitted EPA to use "[a]ll other
data submitted after December 31, 1969 ... in support of another application
for 15 years after the original submission if the applicant offers to
compensate the original submitter." ''  Thus, all data from 1969 to 1978,
regardless of whether it was a trade secret or not, was subject to a mandatory
license. Under the 1978 regime, the IP owner was effectively required to
give up exclusivity, as the EPA could use the data with any other potential
registrants, in exchange for the opportunity to market its product. This is a
clear linkage, though the Court did not approach it as such.
The Ruckelshaus Court examined the facts using the three Penn Central
factors discussed in Part IV.A, principally focusing on the interference with
"reasonable investment-backed expectations.""04 The Court found that there
was only a reasonable investment-backed expectation in secrecy with regard
to data submitted between October 22, 1972, the effective date of the 1972
FIFRA Amendments and October 1, 1978, when the 1978 Amendments took
place."° This was only because the government had created a reasonable
497. See id. at 992.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 993.
501. id. at 993-94; see also supra notes 196-213 and accompanying text.
502. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 994.
503. Id.
504. See id. at 1005.
505. See id. at 1010-14. Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part, would have found that data
submitted prior to October 22, 1972 could effect a taking. See id. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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investment-backed expectation in the 1972 Amendments, by specifying that
the EPA would not use trade secrets."° The government, through its
promises, and through the type of regulatory system it put in place, could
effectively set what expectations were reasonable. The court found that
there would only be a taking of this property without just compensation if
the negotiated/arbitrated license fee did not compensate the loss in market
value of trade secret data. 7 If the fee did give just compensation, then there
was no taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In Section C, below, I
will suggest that this equitable approach could be applied in the SmithKline
case.
By approaching Ruckelshaus through the lens of the Penn Central
factors, the Court did not confront the real issue - that of linkage. The link
was between EPA approval for use and non-exclusivity. Had the Court used
a linkage analysis, it might have found greater protection for the pre-1972
data and perhaps less protection for the 1972-78 data. The linkage analysis
asks, is there an "essential nexus" between the "legitimate state interest" and
the condition exacted;... and if so, is there a "rough proportionality" between
the required condition and the property use permitted by the government?" °
Here, the legitimate state interest is in the efficacy and safety (both human
and environmental) of pesticides. The condition of submitting data to meet
this purpose is easily justified, but what of allowing use of data to consider
competitor's products? The nexus is a weak one. The government interest
could be met by requiring the competitors to generate their own data.
Similarly, it can be met through compensation (as the FIFRA regime
required). Even if the nexus requirement is met, then the "rough
proportionality" requirement is also difficult to meet. The data is made
generally available, not just kept and used by EPA, just on behalf of another
competitor. Were the data used only in the service of approving pesticides,
the very thing the data provider also seeks, the "proportionality" would be
closer. Instead, competitors with access to the data may now use it for other
purposes.
Interestingly, in Nollan, where the Supreme Court addressed linkages
head-on, Justice Scalia distinguished Ruckelshaus as unrelated."' He argued
that a right to register and sell pesticides was a "valuable government
benefit" and not a property right, in contrast to the "right to build on one's
own property," which "cannot remotely be described as a 'government
506. See id at 1005-08.
507. See id. at 1013-14.
508. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
509. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
510. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
benefit"' even though "its exercise can be subject to legitimate permitting
requirements.""' Thus, there was a "voluntary 'exchange' in Ruckelshaus
that did not involve a restriction on one's property rights."2 In dissent,
Justice Brennan contended the cases were indistinguishable: "Monsanto and
the Nollans hold property whose use is subject to regulation; Monsanto may
not sell its property without obtaining government approval and the Nollans
may not build new development on their property without government
approval."" 3 Justice Brennan concluded that "[o]btaining such approval is as
much a 'government benefit' for the Nollans as it is for Monsanto."
4
However, there is one distinction that gives Justice Scalia the better
argument. There is no "right to use" in Monsanto's IP right, unlike the
Nollans' "real property" interest. There is only the right to exclude."' Thus,
while linkage analysis is attractive, it may not be entirely relevant. The
government can always give something for something; only unconstitutional
conditions are prohibited. Thus, in Ruckelshaus, the EPA is giving a right
that the IP owner doesn't have (the right to use) in exchange for something
of value (the right to exclude). It is as if the government was simply buying
the asset.
c. Regulatory Takings
Ruckelshaus applied the Penn Central three-factor test to trade secrets,
and thus demonstrates the test's applicability to intellectual property."'
Although the Ruckelshaus Court focused on the reasonableness of
"investment-backed" expectations,"7 character of government action and
diminution in value are also relevant. However, diminution in value is
harder to conceptualize for those forms of property for which there is no
right to use. Under FIFRA or the FDCA regimes, there can be no takings
cause of action for forbidding the use of an intellectual asset on the grounds
that it is ineffective or unsafe, because there is no right to use the IP asset.
This makes regulatory takings analysis trickier for IP than for "real
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 860 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
514. Id.
515. From a theoretical vantage point, it might be that Monsanto should have a greater claim to
use its property, see id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 15-26
(E. Gough ed. 1947) (1698)), but that is not the law. A labor-dessert theory of property rights might
well give Monsanto a superior claim to use of its property, as the chemical formulae and data "only
came into being by virtue of Monsanto's efforts." Id. However, courts applying the law of property,
and more particularly intellectual property, while relying on such theories in dicta for justification,
have never accepted a particular theory as dispositive. See generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (discussing the traditional theories of property and
their application to intellectual goods).
516. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
517. See id. at 1005-08.
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property." The Lucas per se rule for a total deprivation of economically
beneficial use cannot be applicable as such." ' Dicta in Lucas even suggests
that personal property (as opposed to land) may even be rendered worthless
without causing a taking."9  But this only recognizes that the settled
expectations regarding personal property are less definitive than with land.
However, many forms of IP are clearly defined, such as patents, copyrights,
and trademarks.
Approaching regulatory takings as limitations on the right to use the IP
asset simply proves too much when there is no right of use. Rather,
"regulatory takings" should be approached from the vantage point of
regulations that alter the property right that was conferred. For example,
diminution in value is only relevant against the backdrop of legal use. If use
is legally permissible, and the government restricts the ability to exclude,
then there may be a relevant financial loss. Perhaps a total loss in value in
such scenario could be considered a Lucas-esque per se taking. If the IP
owner was prohibited from using her asset, but others were permitted to use
it, there might be a total taking. Obviously diminution in value is tricky to
apply and will be less important than the character of the government action
and the interference with investment backed expectations.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a classic example of Congressional
"regulation" in adjusting the property right of patents. The 1984 Act
effectively eliminates a patentee's right to exclude competitors from using
the patentee's patent for research and other uses "reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."'' 0 It creates a new cause of
action for the patentee when the competitor files an Abbreviated New Drug
Application with the FDA, seeking approval of its own drug. 2' That cause of
action also comes with an automatic thirty-month injunction against FDA
approval, just for filing suit.' Despite this new cause of action, one fact
518. The fact that an IP asset may be used by the government, for example, does not eliminate that
asset's economic viability. Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 869-70. The very nature of IP is that
one person's use of the asset does not preclude another's use. Even if the doors were flung open (as
they are when a patent expires), the asset still has value to those using it. Therefore, a total
deprivation of economically beneficial use will be rare. However, operating on the assumption that
use of the asset is legal, there may be a market for it. That market would be eliminated if the right to
exclude were eliminated. As suggested below, such a scenario might give rise to a total taking.
519. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) ("[lin the case of personal
property, by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the
property owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless ... .
520. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
521. See id. § 271(e)(2).
522. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii) (2000). Of course, where the patentee may file suit pursuant to
remains clear, actions now held exempt from infringement under 35 U.S.C.
section 271(e)(1) would have infringed a valid patent under section 271(a)
prior to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. '
Opponents of the Amendments suggested that they raised serious
constitutional issues of takings without just compensation.124 The House
Committee Report accompanying the Amendments identifies the Penn
Central factors and suggests that as a "public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the public good, '.2  the
Amendments do not rise to the level of a taking. Rather, this is a case where
there is government regulation with a "legitimate aim independent of its
impact on the value of the property, an aim the government is ordinarily free
to pursue under the police power." '526 The Committee Report questions
whether the Roche decision could create an investment backed expectation,
as it was admittedly a case of first impression. 7 Further, even if
"'expectations' are settled," the Committee Report contends the character of
the government interference is not that of a taking.528 The patents still
remain economically viable after the enactment of section 271(e)(1),5"9 and
the restriction on the right to exclude is only a limited one."' The public
purpose requirement of the Takings Clause is easily satisfied. Although the
most direct beneficiaries of the zone of non-infringement are other
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the purpose is to improve public health
this new cause of action is an altogether different issue. For a discussion of the situs of section
27 1(e) infringement and personal jurisdiction issues, see John C. O'Quinn, There's No Place Like
Home: Finding Personal Jurisdiction in Abbreviated New Drug Application Potent Cases After
Zeneca v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 335 (2000).
523. See Roche Prod, Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861-63 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
524. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 7, 27-29 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2691, 2711-13.
525. Id. at 29 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
526. Heald & Wells, supra note 440, at 870.
527. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2 at 27-30 (discussing Roche, 733 F.2d 858); id. at n.39
(opinion of American Law Division, Library of Congress suggesting the Act expresses "a conclusion
that Roche was wrongly decided, that Congress did not intend the word 'uses' in Sec. 271(a) to
extend so broadly"). "Congress has previously legislated to change what it perceived to be incorrect
judicial decisions and in so doing has adversely affected property rights of the prevailing side in
those cases." Id.
528. Id. at 30.
529. See id. at n. 18.
530. See id. at n.19 ("The situation presented in [the Hatch-Waxman Act] does not result in the
total extinguishment of the patent owner rights, because the patent owner still maintains a right to
exclude others from the commercial marketplace."). In contrast, Congress passed legislation in 1996
that precludes owners of patents on medical and surgical procedures from enforcing those patents.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). This provision, enacted for public health reasons, completely eliminates
the right to exclude. Id. Such a provision, applied retroactively would simply have to be a taking
without compensation. However, section 287(c)(4) provides that "[tihis subsection shall not apply
to any patent issued before the date of enactment of this subsection." Thus, the patent property right
was merely redefined on a going-forward basis, clearly within Congress' power under the Patent and
Copyright Clause.
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through a quicker and greater availability of less expensive
pharmaceuticals."'
The Report concludes that the nature of the interference is regulatory
and should be expected in a highly regulated industry such as food and
drugs.532 It also rationalizes that the Hatch-Waxman Act compensates
roughly the same group affected (albeit indirectly) through patent term
extension. 33 Case law suggests that the shifting and balancing engaged in by
Congress in the 1984 Act does not constitute a taking: "legislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets
otherwise settled expectations.""5 ' Here, there is no use of the "government's
power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general good" but a
general, across the board, evenhanded balancing of benefits and burdens."'
Further,
[T]he powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is
plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no
restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to
modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the
rights of property in existing patents."6
Congress has not deprived the patentee of the general right to exclude,
leaving only an empty shell of a patent right, but rather merely modified the
patent right. The creation of a new cause of action under section 271(e), as
well as the patent-term extension granted at the same time, support this
conclusion. Applying the Penn Central factors reasonably shows the Hatch-
Waxman Act not to be a taking.
The FDA's "Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements
Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the
531. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-15 (1984) (observing that the required
revealing and sharing of data would "eliminate costly duplication of research and streamline the
registration process, making new end-use products available to consumers more quickly").
532. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2 at 30.
533. See id. at n.20.
It is important to note that most patent holders affected by [the Hatch-Waxman Act] will
also receive a benefit from the bill in the form of patent term extension. This type of
exchange of property interests was upheld by the Court in the Grand Central case [Penn
Central], albeit in a different context.
Id.
534. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) (quoting Fleming
v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947)).
535. TRIBE, supra note 472, § 9-6, at 605.
536. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001), quoting McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S.
(1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
Body" '537 are another example of regulatory action which, if taken "too far"
could amount to a taking. These regulations restrict the use of certain terms,
"including terms that appear in some trademarks and trade names." '538 The
FDA rejects that a taking could occur without a deprivation of the
underlying good will that gives value to a trademark."' The character of the
action is regulatory rather than confiscatory. "Dietary supplement
companies will not be precluded from using terms that imply a disease claim
in their trademarks and trade names," but if "they wish to continue using
trademarks and trade names that imply a disease claim, they may do so,
provided that they first meet the safety and efficacy standards and other
regulatory requirements applicable to drugs ... .""'4 Further, the regulations
do not benefit some at the expense of others, "rather, all manufacturers will
be precluded from using trademarks and trade names that contain an implied
disease claim unless they have obtained new drug approval or health claim
authorization." '54 There is no right to use the mark, as it has "always been
illegal to market dietary supplements or other foods with disease
claims ....""' Regulations on the use of trademarks do not cause a loss of
underlying goodwill, and thus the economic diminution is unclear, "even in
cases where a trademark or trade name must be changed because new drug
approval or health claim authorization cannot be obtained." '543 Imposing
regulations that require the trademark owner to spend money proving the
claims is not the kind of economic impact that is categorized as a taking.5"
Finally, and as in Ruckelshaus, most significantly, the investment-backed
expectations that might be abridged are unreasonable.
As noted in Ruckelshaus, "[i]n an industry that long has been the focus
of great public concern and significant government regulation," the
possibility of modifications to the regulatory requirements is substantial. 45
With the high degree of historic regulation of food and drugs in the United
States, even pre-dating the enactment of the FDCA in 1938,46 investment-
537. Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1000.
538. Id. at 1041.
539. See id. at 1042.
540. Id.
541. Id
542. Id. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) ("The use of [property]
for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and.., it was open to the
State at any point to make the implication of those background principles of... law explicit.")
543. Dietary Supplements Regulations, supra note 163, at 1043.
544. Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990) ("Requiring money to be spent is not a taking of property.").
545. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008 (1984) (quoting FHA v. The Darlington,
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)). See also Connolly, v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227
(1986) ("Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object" when the regulatory scheme is
"buttressed ... to achieve the legislative end.").
546. See Peter Barton Hutt, A Historical Introduction, 45 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 17 (1990);
HuTr & MERRILL, supra note 129, at 4-14. Even Roman civil law regulated the integrity of the food
supply. Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of the Integrity of the Food Supply, 4 ANN. REV.
516
[Vol. 29: 435, 2002] Protecting Private Intellectual Property
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
backed expectations that do not take into account the power of the state to
regulate in the public interest are unreasonable. 4' Given that even the Lucas
Court (a champion of property rights if there ever was one) has indicated
that high expectations in personal property (i.e., not "real property"/land) are
not reasonable,"5 these regulations past muster as not going too far.
Having seen how takings jurisprudence can be applied to intellectual
property, Part IV.C applies it to the SmithKline case to determine whether
the FDA's actions (or the Second Circuit's construction of the interplay
between the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Copyright laws) can be considered
an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
C. Was SmithKline a Taking?
When SmithKline sued Watson Pharmaceuticals, a private, non-state
actor, it was for an act of copyright infringement.5"9 However, Watson, in
seeking approval to sell a competing generic nicotine gum product after
SmithKline's patent had expired, was "directed by the Food and Drug
Administration... to use labeling almost identical to appellant's
copyrighted guide and tape."5 ' The FDA, in turn had "acted pursuant to the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act... ."s' The Second Circuit concluded that Watson "cannot be liable for
copyright infringement because the Hatch-Waxman Amendments require
generic drug products to use the same labeling, as was approved by the FDA
for, and is used by the producer of the pioneer drug," in this case the
copyright holder. 2 In Part I, supra, I argued that the FDA interpretation
was overbroad - that it was not in fact required by the Hatch-Waxman Act.53
Nonetheless, let us assume that the FDA interpretation is reasonable or that
the Hatch-Waxman Act necessarily trumps the copyright laws, as decided by
Chief Judge Winter. 54 Then SmithKline has no claim against Watson;
NUTRITION 1 (1984), reprinted in HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 129, at I.
547. See Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 906 (1987).
548. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) ("[I]n the case of personal
property, by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the
property owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless ....").
549. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21,
22 (2d Cir. 2000)
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 23.
553. See supra Part I.C.4.
554. See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 28-29.
however, it may have a claim against the FDA. We can reconceptualize this
case from one of infringement to one of a taking without just compensation.
Here it is the FDA, acting pursuant to congressional authorization,"55 that is
appropriating SmithKline's property and effectively giving it to competitors
for their use. This section explores whether the FDA's actions under the
Hatch-Waxman Act can be cast as a taking and whether a taking actually
occurred.
Under the Second Circuit's interpretation, the Hatch-Waxman Act
effectively serves as a partial amendment to the copyright laws, just as it is
to the patent laws.556 Owners of copyrights on drug labels may not exclude
generic drug manufacturers with approved ANDAs from copying their
labels.5 This cuts at the core of the right to exclude, "the hallmark of a
protected property interest..... This right is taken without any compensation,
just or otherwise, and is given to competitors manufacturing a generic
version of the exact same drug. Facially, a property right has been taken by
the government. Applying the four-factored tested discussed in Parts IV.A
and B will indicate whether this taking falls within the scope of the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of just compensation.
The action taken by the FDA, resulting in Watson being allowed to use
SmithKline's copyright, is not akin to a confiscation of property, as the
government is not appropriating the copyright for its own use nor is it
prohibiting SmithKline from using it. Even though the copyright is
effectively being appropriated for other companies to use, the weak public
interest requirement is easily satisfied.5 Similarly, even if the right to
exclude is a "core" property right, the taking of which is a per se taking, here
there has been no total deprivation of that right. 6° Rather, there has just
been a restriction of the right to exclude under certain circumstances. As the
Second Circuit noted:
We emphasize that we do not read the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
to repeal other rights under the Copyright Act of copyright owners
in SmithKline's circumstances. Even though such an owner cannot
enforce its copyright against generic drug manufacturers who are
required by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to copy labeling and
who do no more than that, it still retains a copyright, if otherwise
555. Congress must at least implicitly authorize a "taking" by the Executive Branch in order for it
to be lawful. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ("The Steel
Seizure Case"); Dames & More v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
556. See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 28-29.
557. See id. at 29.
558. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999).
559. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984).
560. See supra notes 492-95 and accompanying text.
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valid, in the label and might well pursue copyright claims against
potential infringers in other circumstances, e.g., use of the
copyrighted material in non-labeling advertisements. 6
The loss of the right to exclude is narrow. SmithKline could still pursue
infringers who do not have approved ANDAs, as well as those generics that
use its label in advertising or other settings not required by the Hatch-
Waxman Act.
One might think that linkage analysis would be appropriate, as the
copyright owner must seek FDA approval of the drug and label in order to
be able to market, and in exchange for approval, the Hatch-Waxman Act
effectively allows the copyrighted label to be copied. In some sense, the
facts are similar to those in Ruckelshaus. However, Ruckelshaus did not
apply linkage analysis. Nor is it clear that the Hatch-Waxman Act actually
creates a linkage. In the typical linkage case such as Nollan or Dolan, there
is a quid pro quo: the property owner must give up some right for the
specific requested government approval. In the SmithKline scenario, the
right is removed statutorily, without respect to the specifics of approval.
The FDA does not condition approvals on allowing the copyright to be used;
rather, the very definition of the copyright grant is restricted in the case of
ANDAs. The only aspect of this that appears to be a linkage is the fact that
it applies just to labels of FDA approved drugs, because of the very nature of
the ANDA provisions. Further, there is no property right to use the
copyrighted label as labeling - the FDA must approve it - the granting of a
copyright gives no special right to use. '62
Even if the Hatch-Waxman Act were deemed to create a linkage with
the copyright, an "essential nexus" between the "legitimate state interest"
and the condition exacted by the FDA can be shown. The government has a
strong interest in "facilitat[ing] the introduction of generic competitors once
a pioneer drug's patent term and exclusivity periods... ended by allowing
the generic producer to piggy-back upon the pioneer producer's successful
FDA application." '63  Such piggy-backing reduces the need for human
testing, saves time and resources, and creates administrative ease in
approval." In a highly regulated field with an overall strong public health
focus, the government interest in accurate information about drugs is great.
Requiring generic manufacturers to avoid the copyright on a label when the
patent on the underlying product has expired, would "also delay the
561. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 29.
562. See supra notes 520-23 and accompanying text.
563. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 28.
564. See id.
519
introduction of the generic product without advancing public health and
safety to any perceptible degree." '565
There is also a "rough proportionality" between the condition (allowing
label copying) and the effect of the government approval of the pioneer
drug. First, the FDA must approve the label itself. 6 The drug is only
approved for uses on the label. A generic version, which may lawfully be
approved under an ANDA may only be used for the same uses, thus the label
should contain roughly the same things. Further, the Hatch-Waxman Act
preserves a period of exclusivity for the pioneer based on the patent and
other administrative exclusivity periods. Once that exclusivity has expired,
.only then can the copyright interest be trumped. Finally, as noted above, the
Second Circuit's reading of the Hatch-Waxman Act only repeals the limited
right of the copyright owner to exclude competitors with approved ANDAs
from copying its label for use as a label.567 Thus, the extraction is narrow,
focused, limited, and applies outside the scope of the exclusive right to
market the underlying product which FDA approval grants the pioneer. It
allows FDA to grant a limited exclusive period to the pioneer and keep it
limited.
The real question is whether the FDA or Second Circuit interpretation of
the Hatch-Waxman Act could effect a regulatory taking. The character of
the government action cuts both ways. As it affects copyrights as well as
patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act is a regulatory public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the public good. As noted
above, "Legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely
because it upsets otherwise settled 'expectations."'5 68  This would be
expected to be particularly. true in a heavily regulated industry where
expectations are circumscribed by the pervasiveness of regulation. The
Hatch-Waxman regime as a whole sought to create an average reciprocity of
advantage, conferring some new rights on pioneer manufacturers in
exchange for new limitations. Of course, copyrights were not explicitly
considered in that balancing.569 With respect to copyrights, there is no
average reciprocity of advantage for the pioneers as they tend to be different
companies from the generic manufacturers. If all pharmaceutical companies
were involved in pioneer drug development and generic drug manufacturing,
then there would be an average reciprocity of advantage, but that is not the
case. In some respects this appears to be a use of the "government's power
to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general good" rather than
an evenhanded balancing of benefits and burdens. 7 ' Unlike the changes in
565. Id.
566. See id. at 29 n.5.
567. See id. at 29.
568. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731 (1984).
569. See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 29.
570. TRIBE, supra note 472, § 9-6, at 605.
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the patent laws, which created a new cause of action in section 271(e) while
curtailing the scope of infringement under section 271(a), there was no
balancing of the copyright interest. The copyright owner simply loses out,
with nothing added in return.
Unlike many areas of IP, here there is clearly a diminution in value to
the copyright owner. The ANDA provisions (and thus the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act curtailing the copyright laws) only
apply to approved pioneer drugs with their approved labels. The generic
competitor is only copying a drug that is already on the market. Further, the
value of the copyright to the owner is really only against approved
competitors, as non-approved marketing of drugs can be a criminal offense
punishable by imprisonment."' Thus, the only value of the copyright is in
excluding approved, legitimate competitors from using their label. As it will
take the generic time to develop a different label that meets FDA approval,
the copyright potentially extends the exclusivity of the drug, and thus is
extremely valuable to the pioneer. Of course, the argument in response is
that the pioneer was only to have the exclusivity provided by the patent or
the administrative exclusivity period, and not to "piggy-back" on the
copyright laws. The copyright itself has no value, only the underlying drug
does. Thus, the pioneer cannot claim diminution in value from something
outside the scope of the copyright. If anything, the diminution in value
would be no more than the cost of developing the label, which in many cases
is inconsequential compared to the costs (and profits) associated with the
underlying drug."'
As in Ruckelshaus, the most important factor in determining whether the
Hatch-Waxman Act could have effected a regulatory taking of certain
copyrights is the degree to which it interferes with reasonable investment-
backed expectations. SmithKline, for example, had already "invested
substantially" in the Nicorette labeling (to the tune of "one million
dollars"), '73 relying on the existing copyright laws as they were understood
prior to the Second Circuit's decision. SmithKline had a significant
investment in a creative guidebook and audiotape that "are an important part
of the Nicorette product and an important component of the brand image that
SmithKline has sought to create. The introduction into the market of
virtually identical user guides and instructional tapes is likely to confuse
consumers and threaten consumer goodwill." '574 This investment is similar to
571. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) ("Prohibited Acts") & § 333 (2000) ("Penalties").
572. See supra note 83.
573. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
574. Id. at 471.
the scenario Professor Singer describes where a developer "spends
substantial amounts of money on architectural and constriction work for a
particular project in reliance on existing zoning regulations" and the zoning
laws are changed and retroactively applied.57 Such retroactivity makes it
more likely the regulation will be deemed a taking. However, here the
substantial investment was not to get a copyright, but rather to obtain FDA
approval of the pioneer drug in the first instance so that SmithKline could
market Nicorette.57 The copyrighted label itself has no value other than as
associated with the product." ' This view is reinforced by the fact that
SmithKline did not register a copyright on the words and music on the
audiotape until the "day when its exclusivity period for Nicorette expired."5 '
Even if SmithKline had substantial investment-backed expectations in
developing its copyright, these expectations may not be reasonable. If a
property owner's reliance on the continuation of prior law is unreasonable,
there is no taking. 9 As noted above, given the high degree of regulation of
foods and drugs in the United States, investment-backed expectations that do
not take into account the power of the state to regulate in the public interest
are unreasonable."' Although it is tempting to examine the government
action strictly in the light of copyright law, we must remember that the
Hatch-Waxman Act is focused on the pervasively regulated world of
pharmaceuticals. Finally, it can be argued that SmithKline had no
reasonable investment-backed expectation in extending its exclusivity period
beyond that afforded by the patent laws and administrative exclusivity
periods. This last point is perhaps dispositive. As Chief Judge Winter
noted, "The purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments would be severely
undermined if copyright concerns were to shape the FDA's application of
the 'same' labeling requirement."58' As the Hatch-Waxman provisions were
"intended to facilitate the introduction of generic competitors once a pioneer
drug's patent term and exclusivity periods had ended by allowing the generic
producer to piggy-back upon the pioneer producer's successful FDA
application," it is simply unreasonable for a pioneer drug manufacturer to
believe a copyright could be used to extend its exclusivity even for one
575. SINGER, supra note 374, at 1260.
576. See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 29 n.5.
577. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 63 F. Supp.
2d 467, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) "[T]here is no separate market for the guides and tapes .... ").
578. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 23. SmithKline had, however, registered a federal copyright for the
guidebook and the audiotape script nine months earlier. See id.
579. See SINGER, supra note 374, at 1260.
580. See supra notes 568-70 and accompanying text; Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township,
808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir. 1987).
581. SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 28.
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day. 2 Although the case is a close one, SmithKline should not prevail on a
takings claim.'
Although SmithKline should not win a takings claim, it would have still
been valuable for it to raise a takings claim. The doctrine of constitutional
avoidance (interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional questions) counsels
against interpreting the Hatch-Waxman Act in a manner that could be
considered a taking, even if it did not actually rise to the level of a taking.'84
Thus, with the specter of a takings claim sitting in the background, the
Second Circuit might have awarded SmithKline implied license fees or a
reasonable royalty for the use of a copyright, rather than just eviscerating its
cause of action.' By raising a takings claim, constitutional avoidance
doctrine could have prevented SmithKline's copyright from simply being
trumped by the FDA's treatment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Thus,
SmithKline demonstrates the value of raising a takings claim where the
federal government appropriates or impinges on an intellectual property
right.
582. Id.
583. It should also be noted that even if the Hatch-Waxman Act resulted in a taking of copyrights,
that might only be true of those copyrights existing at the time it was enacted. Congress may, of
course, prospectively alter the exclusive rights associated with copyrights, patents, and other forms
of federally-defined intellectual property. As the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984, and
SmithKline did not develop the guide and tape until 1993 and did not seek federal copyright
registration until 1998 and 1999, these would have been copyrights under the copyright laws as
amended sub silentio by Hatch-Waxman. The complicating factor is that the Hatch-Waxman Act
does not specifically address copyrights. Thus, it could be argued that the de facto amendment of
the copyright laws did not occur until the FDA interpreted the Act in a manner requiring Watson to
copy SmithKline's copyright. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214, 1999 WL 1243894, *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999), aff'd, 211 F.3d
21 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Under the later approach, SmithKline would have had its copyrights before the
change in the copyright laws occurred, and thus would at least have a cause of action.
584. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress"); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("[Als
between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and
by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act"); Murray v. The Charming
Betsy, 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.); see also American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.
v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (granting certiorari on a question that would permit the Court to
"avoid[] the constitutional nondelegation issue").
585. See supra Part I.C.3.
D. Takings by the States
A takings approach to government infringement may provide an
independent remedy, or as highlighted by the previous Section, may serve to
strengthen or buttress the intellectual property right claim through the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance. A takings analysis of infringement
may be especially potent when applied to acts of infringement by the states.
As discussed in Part III.A, the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence has rendered the states immune from suits for infringement in
federal court. This result is interesting, if not peculiar, given the current
majority's vigorous protection of property rights in other contexts. "6 In
Florida Prepaid, the Court was able to duck the issue of whether the state
had "taken" the plaintiff s patent. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, or in the
House or Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute, that
Congress had in mind the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Since Congress was so explicit about invoking its
authority under Article I and its authority to prevent a State from
depriving a person of property without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, we think this omission precludes
consideration of the Just Compensation Clause as a basis for the
Patent Remedy Act.587
As the Court was simply examining the constitutionality of the Patent
Remedy Act, it was excused from the broader question of whether the state
had violated the Just Compensation component of the Takings Clause.
Moreover, because the legislative record did not examine the existence or
adequacy of state remedies, much less demonstrate widespread state
infringement, some of which would not even rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, the Court was able to comfort itself in blissful
ignorance of any state takings without just compensation. 8' Resting assured
that the states were not committing a "widespread and persisting
deprivation" of constitutional property rights,"9 the Rehnquist Court was
able to further its jurisprudential project of protecting states' rights without
confronting the limits imposed by its other main jurisprudential project: the
protection of property rights.
This Section examines a key unanswered question from Florida
Prepaid: what currency does the Just Compensation Clause provide in
586. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
587. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 n.7
(1999).
588. See id. at 641-44.
589. Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
524
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questions of state IP infringement?' ° We will explore the clash between
states' rights and property rights head on and consider whether the Just
Compensation Clause, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides a path around Florida Prepaid, Alden, and sovereign immunity
generally, into state or federal court for state acts of infringement.
The Chief Justice's opinion in Florida Prepaid could be read to suggest
that Congress can no more abridge state sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Just Compensation Clause than it could any other constitutional provision
incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 9'
The language he used to describe the remedial aspects of Congress' power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, could be read to require a
590. The other unanswered question from Florida Prepaid is what constitutes the state for
purposes of sovereign immunity? See id. at 633 n3. Although space does not permit me to explore
that question here in detail, it is an issue ripe for extensive litigation. For example, one can imagine
a return to a "traditional" or "integral" state function approach, such as in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), for determining whether the state is behaving as state qua state.
Although National League of Cities was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), after Seminole Tribe and its progeny the viability of Garcia itself is
questionable. Nonetheless, Garcia was correct to criticize the National League of Cities standard as
"unworkable." See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
A better standard for determining what is the state for sovereign immunity purposes might be a
"market participant" approach. Rather than puzzle over whether a particular function is traditionally
or integrally that of a state, instead a court would consider whether the state is competing with
private actors in the market. If not, then it can be assumed to be acting in its sovereign or regulatory
capacity. Such a "market participant" distinction is not novel - it can be found in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (holding that the
distinction between "States as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense
and sound law" and noting that "the commerce clause was directed, as an historical matter only at
regulatory and taxing actions taken by states in their sovereign capacity" and that there was nothing
indicating a "constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the
free market"); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (distinguishing between state
as regulator and state as participating in the market for Commerce Clause purposes); see also I
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-11, at 1088-95 (3d. ed. 2000). A
similar distinction is found in antitrust law under the state action doctrine. See Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943) (distinguishing between a state authorizing private parties to act anticompetitively
and a state itself regulating commerce); AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 88, 165, at 128-34;
Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203,
209-12, 265-70 (2000).
Although the distinction between state qua state and state as market participant may be a difficult
one to draw at times, it is a distinction the courts are already familiar with. Applying the distinction
in Florida Prepaid, the Florida Prepaid program would probably be considered in competition with
other annuity contract plans for financing future college expenses, such as that offered by the
College Savings Bank. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631 ("Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expenses Board... is an entity created by the State of Florida that administers similar
tuition prepayments contracts [to those of College Savings Bank].")
591. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 115 (4th ed. Supp. 2000); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Statement before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, at n.22 (July
27, 2000), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/melt0727.htm.
"history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights"'
even when Congress is enforcing the Just Compensation Clause.59
However, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause is "only a limitation on the power of the
Government to act, not a remedial provision," instead finding that "it is the
Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property rights
amounting to a taking." '593 Each act of taking without just compensation is a
constitutional violation requiring a remedy. Thus, "[a] sovereign immunity
defense [] may not be available against a takings challenge, because the
Court has suggested, although it has not clearly held, that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause trumps state (as well as federal) sovereign
immunity." '594
Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the Takings Clause as "self-
executing."5 5 Further, the Court has observed that "in the event of a taking,
the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution" itself.5 96 First
English suggests that the Takings Clause, and its requirement of just
compensation, even applied to the states operates "of its own force,
furnish[ing] a basis for a court to award money damages against the
government." '597 Thus, Congress need not legislatively attempt to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in order for a state to be sued for a taking without
just compensation in state, and perhaps federal, court.
At a minimum, the "self-executing" nature of the Just Compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause suggests that a state may not close the
doors of its courts to takings claims. For example, in Reich v. Collins,59" a
state court action for a state tax refund, the Court held that the "Constitution
itself' required the state to provide the remedy it has promised. 99 Similarly,
in McKesson Corp. v. Division of ABT,6'° the Supreme Court held
unanimously that if a state requires taxpayers to pay first and obtain review
of a tax's validity later, the Due Process Clause requires the state to provide
a meaningful opportunity to secure postpayment relief." In these cases as
well as Ward v. Love County, 2 the remedy may have been required because
of the Takings Clause, as applied to the states through the Due Process
592. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 n.7 (same).
593. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9
(1987).
594. 1 TRIBE, supra note 590, § 6-38, at 1272-73.
595. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
596. First English, 482 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
597. Id. at 316 n.9 (quoting Solicitor General's brief) (emphasis added).
598. 513 U.S. 106(1994).
599. Id. at 109.
600. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
601. See id. at 36-37.
602. 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (requiring tax refund).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Unlike Alden v. Maine,'°4 in which
the Court held that Congress may not subject non-consenting states to
private suits in their own state courts, 5 here, it is the Constitution itself that
flings wide the doors to a state court. Even the Florida Prepaid Court
recognized that "where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate
remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent" a
constitutional violation may occur.6 Thus, in the case of takings of
intellectual property, just as for "real" property, the state must provide a
mechanism for adjudicating claims and remedying with just compensation. 7
Professor Tribe has suggested that perhaps "because the Constitution
itself prescribes 'just compensation' as the remedy for a taking, a federal
court must have the power to award damages against even an unconsenting
state under a takings claim.""'8 The Constitution itself can give rise to a
cause of action.' And it is generally "presume[d] that justiciable
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts."6 °  Further,
Article III extends the "judicial Power" of the United States "to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution" 6' and Congress has
conferred this jurisdiction on the federal district courts. 612  Thus, it would
603. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 849-50 (1996).
604. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
605. See id. at 732.
606. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999).
Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]n challenging a
property deprivation, the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law
or prove that the available remedies are inadequate.").
607. See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1337 (Fla. 1993)
(holding "a patent holder not preempted under federal law may assert takings and conversion claims
in state court"). The Florida Supreme Court also observed that federal preemption over claims
"arising under" the patent and copyright laws did not "bar state jurisdiction when the complaint
relies on 'reasons completely unrelated to the provisions or purposes of [the patent laws]' such as
the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on the state's taking of private property without due
process or just compensation. id. at 1335. Cf Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (pre-Patent Remedy Act case) (holding that "a patent infringement suit is not the appropriate
legal remedy for vindicating a [state] 'takings' claim" and noting this decision "simply forecloses
one avenue of recourse - the specific relief for infringement of patent rights otherwise provided by
federal statute" but suggesting that a state remedy would necessarily be available).
608. 1 TRIBE, supra note 590, at 1273 n.18.
609. E.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (rejecting the argument that "the Fourth Amendment serves only as a limitation on federal
defenses to a state law claim and not as an independent limitation upon the exercise of federal
power").
610. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-44 (1979).
611. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
612. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution ....").
appear that a plaintiff with a takings claim against a state could bring suit in
a federal court. Nonetheless, Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank6 3 is read to hold that "a state that takes
private property does not violate the Takings Clause until it refuses to pay
the owner just compensation."6 '  Thus, "the assertion of a takings claim
against a state in federal court is not ripe until the state has first denied
compensation in a state inverse-condemnation suit."6 ' Therefore, "as long
as a state renders itself amenable to inverse condemnation actions in its own
courts, a property owner.., cannot assert that the state has taken that
property without just compensation until the state court rejects his
claim,"6 6and there is no cause of action suitable for a federal court under the
Constitution. Dicta in Florida Prepaid would appear to support this view as
applied to intellectual property. As noted above, the Court observed that
"only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to
injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation
of property without due process result."6 7
Williamson County suggests that with respect to intellectual property, as
well as real property, the state must open its courts' doors, or the federal
doors will be open to the IP owner.6 8 The infringing state cannot altogether
avoid liability, though it may force the IP owner to use takings procedures
rather than the law of infringement. 6' 9  However, others suggest that if
Williamson County is just a prudential holding, rather than a constitutional
interpretation, Congress can alter it.620  In some sense, Williamson County
613. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
614. Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional in Light of Seminole
Tribe?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1460 (1999). "Williamson County's apparent holding [is] that a
violation of the Fifth Amendment does not occur until the state has refused compensation." Id. at
1474.
615. Id. See also Daniel J. Meltzer, Statement before the House Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, at n.22 (July 27, 2000), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
melt0727.htm.
616. Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 614, at 1470-71.
617. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999).
See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]n challenging a property deprivation, the claimant must either avail
himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are
inadequate.... When adequate remedies are provided and followed, no... deprivation of property
without due process can result.").
618. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195.
619. Id.
620. See Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate over Federal
Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1999) (suggesting Congress may
eliminate prudential justiciability rules perhaps such as ripeness, though not exhaustion); Private
Property Rights Implementation Act of 2000, H.R. 2372, 106th Cong. (March 20, 2000) (providing
for ripeness of a cause of action for a deprivation of a property right upon the action by a state actor
causing actual and concrete injury); cf Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734
n.7 (1997) (noting that "ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power
and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction").
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just prescribes an act of abstention - allowing the state to resolve the alleged
taking before permitting a federal court to engage in constitutional review of
the state's action. 62' In fact, the venerable Home Telephone case,622 which is
directly on point, affirms this view.
In Home Telephone the plaintiff telephone company alleged that phone
rates were fixed "so unreasonably low that their enforcement would bring
about the confiscation of the property of the corporation, and hence the
ordinance was repugnant to the due process clause of the 14"'
Amendment." 3  The state argued that because the actions "were
presumptively repugnant to the state Constitution, such could not be treated
as acts of the state within the Fourteenth Amendment, and hence no power
existed in a Federal court to consider the subject" that is "until, by final
action of an appropriate state court, it was decided that such acts were
authorized by the state, and were therefore not repugnant to the state
Constitution.""62 The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice White, rejected this
view, noting that it would "attach to the exercise of Federal judicial power
under all circumstances" and "hence render impossible the performance of
the duty with which the Federal courts are charged under the
Constitution."" The Court rejected the "paralysis" that would "inevitably
ensue" if the ability to exercise federal judicial power "would depend on the
ultimate determination of the state court, and would therefore require a stay
of all action to await such determination." '626 The Supreme Court refused to
create a situation in which the "Federal courts ... would have to await the
determination of a state court as to the operation of the Constitution of the
United States," thus "caus[ing] the state courts to become the primary source
for applying and enforcing the Constitution of the United States in all cases
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment."627  Instead, the scope of federal
judicial power under the "reach of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is...
coextensive with any exercise by a State of power, in whatever form
exerted.""62
621. Cf R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
622. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
623. Id. at 281.
624. Id. at 282.
625. Id. at 284.
626. Id.
627. Id. at 285.
628. Id. at 287. A similar interpretation was given to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), which rejected the argument that federal courts could not apply § 1983 if state
courts allow a remedy for the alleged constitutional violation.
529
Home Telephone would suggest that federal courts could consider
claims of takings in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments even
before a state tribunal has adjudicated the matter. Williamson County must
then be prudential, and as such amendable by Congress. Congress can
create a cause of action for takings of intellectual property by the states,
which may be brought in federal court. In the case of patents, Congress
could route appellate review of state takings claims brought in federal
district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
hence preserving the goal of uniformity in the patent laws.629 Thus, the
Takings Clause provides a means for ensuring greater protection of
intellectual property from state appropriation and infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in SmithKline is a stark reminder that
vigilance is the price for preserving intellectual property rights. Courts stand
ready to trade these rights away for other, often worthy, goals such as
administrative deference and the protection of states rights. The Supreme
Court's decisions in Florida Prepaid and College Savings as well as other
judicial decisions have led to a curtailing of federal protection of intellectual
property, particularly where the states are involved. Despite these defeats
for IP, there is a means for overcoming some of the recent judicially-enacted
obstacles to protecting intellectual property. That means is the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. In some cases government infringement is an actionable
taking. Yet, even where government action limiting IP rights does not rise
to the level of a taking, the Takings Clause can be used to protect IP. The
overly broad decision of the Second Circuit in SmithKline, effectively
wiping out all meaningful copyright protection for pioneer drug
manufacturers, might have been narrowed had the court considered the
potential takings ramification of its decision.
629. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644
(1999) (noting concerns over state remedies being "less convenient than federal remedies" and
"undermin[ing] the uniformity of patent law"); id. at 2211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting on
the "principle that undergirds all aspects of our patent system: national uniformity"). Professor
Meltzer suggests inventive ways to have state adjudications of patent claims routed to the Federal
Circuit, either through appeal from the highest state court, appeal from the state trial court, or a
certification to the Federal Circuit. Daniel J. Meltzer, Statement before the House Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, at n.22 (July 27, 2000), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/melt0727.htm. Such heroic efforts to preserve uniformity in the
patent system would be unnecessary if a federal takings action for patents were available, as
patentees would likely choose the federal forum. Furthermore, Congress presumably could make the
federal takings action an exclusive remedy, just as federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
claims of patent and copyright infringement.
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With the Takings Clause moved from the distant background to the
forefront of intellectual property protection, courts will be guided by the
principle of constitutional avoidance, and thus will seek more equitable
resolutions, rather than simply allowing IP rights to be trumped.
Considerations of "just compensation" could have led the SmithKline court
to provide some financial remedy to the copyright owner, even though it
might have withheld injunctive relief. Finally, the self-executing nature of
the Takings Cause suggests an effective remedy for state infringement of
intellectual property rights. States cannot hide behind sovereign immunity
when they infringe. At a minimum, they must provide a state forum to
adjudicate takings claims and dispense just compensation. Moreover, the
Takings Clause provides a self-executing abrogation of state sovereign
immunity that should allow Congress to create a federal remedy.
The time has come to recognize the scope of intellectual property rights
and the protection provided for these rights by the Constitution - including
the Takings Clause. Only by discerning the full applicability of the Takings
Clause to IP rights and seizing upon these protections can federal and state
agencies be held accountable to the laws that protect intellectual property.
SmithKline represents a lost opportunity in the interplay between patent,
copyright, and other intellectual property laws and the Takings Clause. If
future litigants and adjudicators appreciate the full potency of the Takings
Clause with respect to intellectual property, then the growing gaps in IP
protection can be closed, providing much needed security for the intellectual
assets that are the building blocks of the Twenty-First Century economy.

